Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 20, Issue 3

1996

Article 7

European Community Antitrust Law:
Innovation Markets and High Technology
Industries
John Temple Lang∗

∗

Copyright c 1996 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj

European Community Antitrust Law:
Innovation Markets and High Technology
Industries
John Temple Lang

Abstract
This Article considers how far high technology industries give rise to Community antitrust law
questions that are new and limited to or characteristic of those industries. Originally, this Article
was to discuss the Community antitrust law experience of the issues raised at the U.S. Federal
Trade Commission (”FTC”) hearings and in the FTC report on innovation competition (”FTC
Report”). Not all of the issues considered by the FTC, however, have arisen in Europe to such
an extent that makes it worthwhile to consider them, and some issues have arisen or are arising
in the European Community that have not been considered by the FTC. This Article, therefore,
is limited to Community issues, issues characteristic of high-technology sectors, and, primarily,
issues of law and not of economics. This Article, therefore, does not repeat the many points in
the FTC Report that would certainly be accepted by the European Commission (”Commission”)
and probably also by the Community courts, but that have not yet clearly arisen in the European
Community.

ARTICLES
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ANTITRUST LAW:
INNOVATION MARKETS
AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY
INDUSTRIES
John Temple Lang LL.D*
Computers' . . . cultural impact probably won't be as

great, and cannot be as bad, as that of TV.'
There is no necessary connection between great science
and great business opportunities: the general theory
of rela2
tivity has yet to be turned into a money-spinner.
INTRODUCTION
The phrase "high technology industries" is usually understood to mean telecommunications, aerospace, biotechnology,
computers and computer software, and related industries. This
Article considers how far high technology industries give rise to
Community antitrust law questions that are new and limited to
or characteristic of those industries. There are'many industries
today that use telecommunications for transferring information
or that use powerful computers either in production or design
processes or in the end product itself, but are not popularly
thought of as high technology industries and that do not seem to
raise any special or characteristic antitrust issues. These latter
industries are largely outside the scope of this Article.
Originally, this Article was to discuss the Community antitrust law experience of the issues raised at the U.S. Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") hearings and in the FTC report on
* Director in the Competition Directorate General - European Commission; Professor, Trinity College Dublin. A version of this Article will appear in 1996 FoRDHAM
CORP. L. INST. (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1997). Copyright © TransnationalJuris Publications,
Inc., 1997. Opinions expressed are purely personal.
1. James Fallows, Caught in the Web, N. Y. REv. BooKs, Feb. 15, 1996, at 14, 18.
2. Survey of Biotechnology and Genetics, ECONOMISr, Feb. 25, 1995, at 4.
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innovation competition 3 ("FTC Report"). Not all of the issues
considered by the FTC, however, have arisen in Europe to such
an extent that makes it worthwhile to consider them, and some
issues have arisen or are arising in the European Community
that have not been considered by the FTC. This Article, therefore, is limited to Community issues, issues characteristic of hightechnology sectors, and, primarily, issues of law and not of economics. This Article, therefore, does not repeat the many points
in the FTC Report that would certainly be accepted by the European Commission ("Commission") and probably also by the
Community courts, but that have not yet clearly arisen in the
European Community.
A. Features of High Technology Industries
There are thirteen important features of high technology
industry that this Article discusses.
" One Important Feature is the speed of technological
change. In computers, software, biotechnology, information technology, telecommunications, and television
("TV'), technological change is much more rapid than in
most other industries. In telecommunications in particular, the combined effects of digital transmission, fiber optics, microelectronics, and wireless telephony have enormous implications, especially when combined with the liberalization of regulatory regimes in the European
Community. Product life cycles are often short. This
often means important first mover 4 advantages, which
may in turn create a need for interim antitrust measures.
* Due to technological change, research and development
("R&D") is extremely important for all companies in these
sectors, and all companies need to spend very large
amounts of money on R&D. In some industries, the initial
fixed costs of production, including R&D, are vastly
greater than the marginal cost of additional units of production. This raises complex issues concerning predatory
pricing. It also increases the importance of patents.
* A third feature is the technical sophistication and the
3. ANTICIPATING THE 21sr CENTURY. COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW HIGH-TECH,
GLOBAL MARKETPLACE, A REPORT BY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION STAFF (1996)
[hereinafter ANTICIPATING THE 21ST CENTURV].

4. First movers are the first firms into a market. Whyfirst may not last, ECONOMIST,
Mar. 16, 1996, at 65.
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complexity of the goods and services in high technology
industries and the processes used to produce them. These
goods include dual-use goods which are suitable for both
military and civilian purposes.
" As a result of the speed of technological change, R&D,
technical sophistication, and the complexity of goods, patents and know-how are extremely important. Furthermore, in the field of biotechnology, scientific knowledge,
which is not patentable and which is more basic than anything normally described as know-how, is particularly important.
" In high technology sectors, regulatory issues are important in the European Community. Apart from competition law, questions arise as to what extent, if at all, these
sectors should be regulated either by the European Community or, insofar as this may be useful or possible, by the
national authorities of the Member States. In telecommunications, liberalization and the end of the national monopolies are creating scope for competition and the need
to apply antitrust law more fully.5
* Another important feature is that previously separated operations are becoming integrated and previously integrated tasks are becoming separated from one another.
For example, in 1993 and 1994, it was thought by industry
analysts that the video game, computer, and cable TV industries would come together. More recently, analysts
have concentrated on the Internet and World Wide Web,
on the coming together of "content providers," and the
means of distribution of their films, videos, books, and
programs, and on the convergence of TV and interactive
personal computer technologies. The boundaries between upstream and downstream markets are changing.
Telephone, cable broadcasting, and computer companies
are all coming into the same series of new related markets.
5. Article 90 had already been used. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 90, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573, 629 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. C 224/1 (1992),
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter TEU]. The TEU, supra, amended
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I1) [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by
Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in
TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC OWl Pub. Off. 1987). See Herbert Ungerer, EU Competition Law in the Telecommunications, Media, and Information Technology Sectors, 19 FoR HAM INT'L LJ. 1111, 1111-17 (1996); 1995 FoiwHAM CORP. L. INST.
456 (Barry Hawk ed., 1996).
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Railway and cable TV companies are using or planning to
use their optical fiber networks for telecommunications
purposes. Where the boundaries of markets are legally
important, as in the case of the essential facilities antitrust
principle, it is essential for antitrust lawyers to understand
these changes and their significance.
These industries are also characterized by many functional
service relationships between companies as buyers and
suppliers of infrastructure. These relationships, which
often involve a high degree of dependence, give rise to
legal questions of access, exclusivity, and foreclosure, as
well as access charge policies and interconnection issues
that are usually thought of as regulatory rather than antitrust issues. They also give rise to the possibility of day-today minor discrimination and resulting controversies.
This means that companies are often reluctant to make
formal complaints against other companies with which
they need to maintain working relationships. This may
make it necessary for the Commission to begin procedures on its own initiative when normally it prefers to act
only on complaints.
Some high technology industries, notably telecommunications, include companies that still have monopoly rights in
some areas, in particular voice telephony, that would enable them, unless constrained by law from doing so, to
cross-subsidize and exclude competitors from competitive
markets.
High-tech markets are characterized by complex relationships, due in part to the number of different kinds of companies that may be involved in any given situation. For
example, in cable TV there are the companies that own
the transmitters and satellites, program producers, advertisers, and cable-owning companies, as well as viewers and
competitors of any or all of these companies. There are
also companies such as sports organizations, stadium owners, and Olympic committees that own the right to broadcast sport events, and film studios with portfolios of films.
It is sometimes said that in these markets innovation may
be more important than prices, in particular where the
market itself is emerging and wholly new products or services are coming into existence. It is, however, important
to be clear. In these markets, price is often less important
than the technical or other advantages of the product.
These advantages are usually due to an innovation, which
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is likely to be a recent innovation because all or almost all
the features of these products are changing. But, it is not
innovation as such that constitutes the advantage, and one
cannot assume that any innovation is always and automatically an improvement or is better than a competitor's
product that has not changed in the same respect. It is
unlikely that there is any precise or useful statistical relationship between R&D expenditure of different companies in the same industry and their relative market shares
at a later time. As it is their position relative to one another that is important for antitrust law, simply measuring
the total R&D spending does not seem to help. In the
software industry, for example, what seems to be crucial is
to have programers who know how to produce the next
product that the market will need or will buy.
" In information-based industries, the value of products or
services is often affected by the number of companies or
individuals participating in the network or system. Examples given in the FTC Report are "automatic teller networks, computer operating systems, facsimile communication protocols, word processing programs, video game systems, spread sheet programs, cable TV systems, and office
e-mail."6 This leads to a need for standards or interface
definitions. As the FTC pointed out, this may require antitrust scrutiny of procedures for admitting or excluding
participants and the dominance of companies controlling
the system, network, or interface standard. This issue has
arisen in the European Community.
* High technology industries share some features with other
industries that are important. These include the great size
of some of the companies, the huge amounts of money
involved, high entry barriers in some areas, many strategic
alliances, short product life cycles, great inequality between the sizes of some competitors and, for some products and services at least, that the markets will be worldwide in the future or are becoming so already.
" That in some industries, for example media, there are
companies with world-wide activities, does not prove that
the markets are world-wide. In the European Community,
the markets for TV, radio, and newspapers are essentially
national, for a series of linguistic, cultural, social, and
commercial reasons and they will almost certainly con6.

ANTICIPATING THE

21sT

CENTURY,

supra note 3, vol. 1, ch. 1, at 14.
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tinue to be national. In some industries, for example,
pharmaceuticals, partly separate national markets continued to exist at least until 1995 due to national regulatory
policies, companies' behavior, or both.
In one important high technology industry, telecommunications, as part of the Community's liberalization program, the Commission has published guidelines on the
application of EEC competition rules in the telecommunications sector. 7 This Article does not analyze those guidelines in detail, but refers to many of the guidelines. The
guidelines also illustrate how closely antitrust and regulatory issues are linked in this industry and, to a lesser extent, in other high-tech industries.
B. High Technology Industries in the European Community
It is important to remember something else about high-tech
industries in the European Community:
European firms have been bad at getting into new hightech industries. Europe's high-tech firms are feeble in comparison with American ones. Only two of the top 20 software
firms are European. Staid bankers are suspicious of revolutionary ideas. Venture capitalists have no one to sell their investments to. In a world where small, even symbolic stakes
give bankers or founding families a great deal of say in the
management of firms, it is often impossible to get outsiders to
invest.8
This fact, combined with the fact that there is less public
discussion of antitrust economics in the European Community
than in the United States, has caused this Article to be very different from the FTC's Report. The conclusions are similar, but I
will not discuss antitrust economics as much as the IFTC Report.
This is also because there is much less antitrust litigation in the
European Community than in the United States. More cases are
brought to antitrust authorities than to the courts, and this
means that the intellectual development of antitrust law is
7. Guidelines on the Application of EEC Competition Rules in the Telecommuni-

cations Sector, OJ. C 233/2 (1991). See generally Ungerer, supra note 5 (discussing liberalization of telecommunications law in the European Community). The Commission
is also publishing a notice on access in the telecommunications industry.
8. LeD(acue)efi Americain, again, ECONOMIST,July 13, 1996, at 20. Uncertainty over

the legal position of biotechnological inventions in the European Community has probably also delayed and discouraged investment.
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largely in the hands of the antitrust authorities. Because European Community antitrust authorities are mostly understaffed
and overworked, intellectual development is driven by cases and
not by studies or formal discussion of antitrust economics.
C. Legal Issues Raised by High Technology Industries
Some of the most important legal questions in EC antitrust
law characteristically raised by high technology industries are:
* Is future market power more effectively measured by comparing R&D expenditure than by measuring present market shares?
* Are the boundaries of present markets and the degree of
substitutability of products or services involved likely to
change in a way that is significant for antitrust assessment?
" Do the features of whatever market is relevant in any particular case mean that dominance and market power is
more or less stable than it would otherwise be?
" Is it useful to speak of a separate market for R&D, or is a
large and successful R&D activity merely an important
competitive advantage to be taken into account when assessing dominance?
" In what circumstances are selective pricing and cross-subsidies by dominant companies unlawful?
" What are the criteria for joint dominance and abuse of a
joint dominant position in a rapidly changing market?
* Is the concept of an essential facility useful in connection
with horizontally integrated companies?
" How does competition law regulate access to membership
of networks?
* When, if ever, is it right to regard scientific knowledge as
an essential facility in the biotechnology industry?
" Is it necessary to develop new categories of abuse of dominant positions, contrary to Article 86 of the EC Treaty?9
" Where is the right place to draw the boundary between
antitrust law and regulation of industries for non-competition objectives?
9. It is generally agreed that it is unlawful for a dominant enterprise to use, for its
own purposes, information it gets from providing a service to one of its competitors.

But this kind of misbehavior does not fit neatly into the three traditional categories of
exploitative, anticompetitive, or exclusionary and reprisal abuses. It is probably best
regarded as exploitative, taking unfair advantage of a dominant position. See John
Temple Lang, Abuse of Dominant Positionsin European Community law, Present and Future:

Some Aspects, in 1979

FORDHAM CORP.

L.

INST.

25, 43-65 (Barry Hawk ed., 1980).
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What kind of behavior is predatory if the marginal cost of
additional production is almost zero?
This Article does not, and could not, do more than analyze
some aspects of the problems that are specific to high-tech industries. It could not resolve them all or discuss them all exhaustively.
In addition to these special issues, high technology industries also raise some constitutional issues, discussed in Part IV of
this Article, and some more general issues of EC antitrust law in
a particularly acute way. These include:
* intellectual property and antitrust law;
* justifications for refusing access to essential facilities;
" Article 90 of the EC Treaty;
" interim measures and first mover advantage;
* the relationship between EC antitrust law and national
regulatory measures;
" how far cooperation, that would otherwise be considered
anticompetitive, is justified when dealing with a monopolist or monopsonist;
" how best to prevent dominant companies, whose facilities
their competitors must use, from using the information
they can obtain to compete with those using the dominant
companies' facilities;
* how far standard-setting bodies, with or without governmental participation, fall under Article 85 and when standards are permissible under Article 85(3);
* how to protect intellectual property rights to material that
can now be easily reproduced, namely material and information on the Internet, CDs, and CD-ROMs;
" what duties Community law imposes on dominant buyers;
" framework agreements between competitors that outline
arrangements for cooperation between them that are not
supplemented by specific detailed agreements on particular R&D projects;
* what the rights of third parties are if the parties to an exempted agreement breach a condition or obligation imposed on them; and
" whether, and if so how far, traditional collective arrangements for payment of royalties, particularly performing
rights societies, collection societies, and the10 like, should
be permitted or are suitable in multimedia.
10. New technologies also raise some basic issues of national law, such as whether
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Because many of these issues arise in new or different ways, they
often need to be resolved by reference to first principles of antitrust law and antitrust economics.
Unfortunately, the European Court ofJustice ("Court") has
not clarified these issues and not all EC lawyers understand these
issues well. Differences of opinion are understandable, but
there is an unnecessary degree of intellectual confusion on some
of these issues, partly because some lawyers have their own agendas or their own fixed ideas.1 1 Because high technology industries raise new kinds of antitrust problems or old problems in
new ways, they place considerable demands on lawyers' fundamental understanding of the basic principles of antitrust law.
They also tempt complainants' lawyers to make what are really
regulatory policy arguments under the guise of antitrust law.
All of the economic issues arising in high-tech industries
identified in the FTC Report have arisen or are certain to arise
in the European Community. They are, however, discussed in
this Article only insofar as there is Community case law or practice addressing an issue or insofar as the situation in the European Community is different from that in the United States.
I. THE CASE LAW OF THE COURT OFJUSTICE THAT IS
RELEVANT TO HIGH-TECHINDUSTRIES
In general, the case law of the Court of Justice and the
new kinds of media are "broadcasting" and as so fall under the jurisdiction of the German Ander or under German Federal jurisdiction.
11. In any rapidly changing industry in which there are unresolved antitrust issues,
there are naturally lawyers whose arguments on behalf of their clients would not be
generally accepted. There are also in the European Community a small number of
lawyers who believe in what is called the Freiburg Theory of Competition Law, because
it was popular in that city in the 1950s. In short, this theory posits that a restriction of
competition exists only when companies undertake commitments that limit their freedom of action. According to this theory, companies could freely exchange price information or use the same sales company as long as they were careful to avoid making any
commitment to do so. This view would deprive the words "concerted practice" and "or
effect" in Article 85 of the EC Treaty of most of their meaning. These views are worth
mentioning here only because they are so fundamental that when they are brought into
any discussion based on antitrust principles, confusion is likely to arise. The theory
finds no support in the case law of the Community Court in Luxembourg, and is incompatible with the case law addressing the words of Article 85, referred to above, which
those who believe this theory do not hesitate to say is wrong. Nor, as far as I know, does
the theory resemble any rules of national law in EC Member States, except perhaps the
U.K Restrictive Practices Act which is universally regarded as over-formal, legalistic, and
unsatisfactory.
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Court of First Instance, at least in the area of EC antitrust law,
has not given rise to particular issues concerning the features of
the high technology industries listed above. One would expect
the Court of First Instance to enquire thoroughly into these issues when they arise before it, but there are few indications in
the case law of how they would be decided. It is worth, however,
making several comments about the case law of the EC courts:
* The Court of Justice showed, in the AKZOjudgment 12 on
predatory prices, that when it has to deal for the first time
with a question of fundamental importance in antitrust
law, it does so with great care and thoroughness and
reaches results that are generally accepted as sound. The
first and second Wood Pulpjudgments'3 on extraterritorial
application of EC antitrust law are also examples of the
Court of Justice's careful and balanced consideration of
fundamental issues;
* In its judgments on the Commission's general measures
under Article 90 on telecommunications terminals and
telecommunications services, the Court of Justice dealt
with many of the basic problems of 4liberalizing those markets in the European Community;1
" The importance of confidential information is so great in
high-technology industries that it is likely that questions
about confidentiality will arise increasingly often in connection with them;"
* In Commercial Solvents,16 the Court of Justice had to consider the argument that Commercial Solvents did not really have a dominant position because experiments had
been carried out that suggested that the raw material
could be produced by an alternative process. The Court
12. AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission, Case C-62/86, [1991] E.C.R. 1-3359, [1993]
5 C.M.L.R. 215.
13. Re Wood Pulp Cartel: Ahlstr6m Osakeyhtio and Others v. Commission, joined
cases 89/85, [1988] E.C.R. 5193, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 901.
14. France v. Commission, Case C-202/88, [1991] E.C.R. 1-1223, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R
552; Spain v. Commission, Case C-271/90, [1992] E.C.R. 1-5833; see Italy v. Commission, Case 41/83, [1985] E.C.R. 873, [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. 368 [hereinafter British
Telecom].
15. See, e.g., BPB Industries and British Gypsum, Case C-174/94, [1995] E.C.R. I865, [1996] C.M.L.R. 601; Atlantic Container Line and Others, Case T-395/94R, order
dated Mar. 10, 1995.
16. Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Commission, Joined Cases 6-7/73, [1974] E.C.R. 223, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R. 309 [hereinafter
Commercial Solvents].
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of Justice brushed the argument aside, saying that it did
not involve a commercial production process;
Appeals from the Court of First Instance to the Court of
Justice are, at least in theory, on points of law only. So
only insofar as the special features of high-tech industries
can raise points of law will 17it be possible to bring them
before the Court of Justice;
" The Court of Justice has recognized that Article 36 of the
EC Treaty applies to both a Member State's internal security and its external security and that the export of dual-use
goods, which are capable of being used for civilian and
military purposes, to a country that is at war may affect the
security of a Member State; 8 and
" The Court of First Instance, in 1996, annulled the Commission's decision authorizing European Broadcasting
Union ("EBU")/Eurovision System. 19 This was an individual exemption for the statutes of the EBU, an association
of national radio and TV companies. The agreement was
for joint exclusive acquisition of TV rights to sports events.
Competition between them was avoided and their negotiating position strengthened. The Commission identified
certain benefits, of which the exchange of the TV signal
was the most significant. There was competition from independent broadcasters.
In Mitropole Tilivision v. Commission, the Court of First Instance stated that the EBU rules for the admission of members
were not objective and precise enough to be applied in a uniform, non-discriminatory manner. ° Also, the Commission had
given too much weight to the public service nature of some of
the broadcasting companies, though the special exemption for
services of general economic interest 21 was not applicable, and
17. Questions referred to the Court ofJustice under Article 177 of the EC Treaty

also can only be questions of law, not fact.
18. Fritz Werner Industrie v. Germany, Case C-70/94, [1995] E.C.R. 1-3189; Leifer,
Case C-83/94, [1995] E.C.R. 1-3231; see EEC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 223-24; Commis-

sion v. Greece, Case C-120/94 R, order dated June 29, 1994.
19. Commission Decision No. 93/403, O.J. L 179/23 (1993) [hereinafter EBU
Eurovision].
20. M6tropole T616vision v. Commission, Case T 528/93, [1996] 5 C.M.L.R. 386
(Ct. First Instance) [hereinafter Eurovision]. The Court cited Metro Grossmirkte, Case
26/76 [1977] E.C.R. 1875, [1978] 2 C.M.L.R. 1. This case is important because Metro
was clearly not dominant.
21. EC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 90(2), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 629.
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their public service nature was not enough to justify their acquisition of exclusive rights.
It is worth noting several points in Mitropole T&vision. First
of all, it is essential that a group creating privileged and lessprivileged companies must have clear membership criteria and
apply them uniformly. The Court of First Instance clearly
thought that they had not been applied in this way and said that
only if the membership criteria were precise would it be possible
to determine whether they were indispensable. Secondly,
merely having a public service task or purpose does not justify
any privilege or preferential treatment not directly and necessarily linked to the task. Furthermore, failure to apply membership
admission criteria in a non-discriminatory manner means that
Article 85(3) does not apply and it is not merely a ground for
claiming compensation. This confirms that the Commission
may impose a non-discrimination obligation for membership or
access as a condition under Article 85(3), even in the absence of
dominance. Finally, the judgment does not mean that a buying
cartel must be open to all companies or to all companies that
meet its membership criteria; its criteria might be capable of being fulfilled by so many companies that it could not be authorized at all because it would have too much power. Its membership criteria must be written so as to achieve the economies of
scale or other advantages sought, but not to make possible unnecessary anticompetitive effects. If an open-ended cartel has a
size limit, whatever it is, then membership on a first-come basis is
inherently discriminatory, because sooner or later a line must be
drawn to exclude an applicant who is as well qualified as the
existing members.
A. Intellectual Property Rights
The Court in its RTE-ITP judgment2 2 on TV programs,
clearly stated that intellectual property rights cannot be used in
all cases as a defense against an argument that a company has
abused its dominant position. In RTE-1TP, the Court relied on
three relatively simple arguments. The first argument was that
22. Radio Telefis Eireann and Independent Television Publications v. Commission, Magill, Joined cases C-241/91P & C-242/91P, [1995] E.C.R. 1-743, [1995] 4
C.M.L.R. 718 [hereinafter RTE-ITP]; see Temple Lang, Defining Legitimate Competition:
Companies' Duties to Supply Competitors and Access to Essential Facilities, 18 FoRD.HAm INT'L
L.J. 437, 449-54 (1994).
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the TV monopolies' refusal to provide basic information to the
Magill magazine about their TV programs, relying on copyright
law, prevented the appearance of a new product that the monopolies do not produce themselves and for which there was a potential consumer demand. Secondly, the TV monopolies
claimed no justification for the refusal as a result of the activity
of TV broadcasting or in publishing TV magazines. Thirdly, the
Court found that the TV monopolies reserved for themselves the
secondary or related market of the weekly TV guides. This judgment does not and could not resolve all of the issues that arise
when EC antitrust law and intellectual property rights meet, but
it demonstrates that at least in some circumstances antitrust law
takes precedence.2
The RTE-1TP judgment 4 can and probably should be regarded as simply continuing the line that the Court of Justice
had established in earlier cases.2 5 This consisted of two rules.
First, mere refusal by a dominant enterprise to license an intellectual property right is not, in itself, contrary to Article 86 of the
EC Treaty. Second, refusal is an abuse if it is combined with
some other additional element of abusive conduct, such as excessive prices, arbitrary refusal to supply, or failing to supply
spare parts that are needed in order to force consumers to buy
new products to replace the old ones. This way of looking at the
RTE-1TPjudgment explains its brevity, as the Court simply referred to its previous case law. The Court was simply saying that
in this case there were two "additional" elements and no justification for the refusal. If this is the correct way to read the judgment, which would explain why the Court did not consider it
necessary to comment at length on the Advocate General's arguments, the RTE-ITP judgment does not significantly alter the
law, and either preventing the emergence of a new product objectively needed by consumers or reserving a second complementary market to the dominant companies2 6 would be enough,
23. RTE-/TP, [1995) E.C.R. at 1-743, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. at 718.
24. Id.
25. Volvo AB v. Erik Veng (U.K.) Ltd., Case 238/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6211, [1989] 4
C.M.LR. 122.
26. See Hugin Kassaregister AB v. Commission, Case 22/78, [1979] E.C.R. 1869,
[1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 345; cf. Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Serv. Inc., 504 U.S. 451
(1992); MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 891 (1983).
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in the absence of specific justification, to make the refusal to
license contrary to Article 86. The Court was saying, in effect,
that the Advocate General was wrong to say that the TV stations
were merely refusing to license, because that ignored the two
other effects. This reading also shows why the Court of Justice
felt itself to be so close to the reasoning of the Court of First
Instance.2 7 All this means that the key question, if there is no
other "abusive conduct" involved, is whether plaintiffs product
or service is in a second market distinct from the market in
which the intellectual property right primarily operates, so that
the plaintiffs product or service is not merely the kind of product or service primarily protected by the right. The Court could,
therefore, be saying that the market for comprehensive TV
magazines is distinct from the market for magazines limited to a
single station or, as the judgment suggests, 28 that TV broadcasting was the primary market and the "market of weekly TV
guides" was a "secondary" market which the stations were not
free to monopolize. This is, however, open to the criticism that
under the relevant national laws the copyright was not in the TV
programs as broadcast but in the printed advance lists of those
programs, and this is why the RTE-ITPjudgment remains controversial. The best way to summarize thejudgment, therefore, may
be to say that the refusal to license is contrary to Article 86 if it is
combined with or is the means of committing abusive conduct
that has effects other than those that would be caused in the
market primarily protected by the intellectual property right, by
the mere refusal itself. The significance of the phrase "abusive
conduct" seems to be twofold: first, the behavior or effects in
question do not necessarily need to constitute an abuse in themselves without or irrespective of the refusal to license; and second, the remedy is, therefore, not merely to end the effects but
to require a compulsory license.

27. Case T-69/89, [1991] E.C.R. 11-485, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 586 (Ct. First Instance)
[hereinafter RTE]; British Broadcasting Corporation and BBC Enterprises Ltd. v. Commission, Case T-70/89, [1991] E.C.R. 11-535, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 669 (Ct. First Instance)
[hereinafter BBCJ; Independent Television Publications Ltd. v. Commission, Case T76/89, [1991] E.C.R. 11-575, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 745 (Ct. First Instance) [hereinafter

IT/'].
28. RTE-ITP, [1995] E.C.R. at 1-824,

56.
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B. The Commission's Decisions

The Commission's decisions summarized briefly below will
be understood more easily if they are introduced by saying that
many of them raise issues imposed on companies with large market shares concerning access to essential facilities, joint ventures
between parents in markets that are complementary (whether
horizontally or vertically), membership of standard-setting
groups, and obligations not to discriminate. The industries involved in most of these cases are pharmaceuticals, media, telecommunications, and computers. In several media cases, mergers or joint ventures between dominant content providers and
dominant carriers, broadcasters, or satellite or cable companies
have been prohibited. What in the United States are called innovation markets have been considered several times recently, in
particular in pharmaceutical cases. Out of the five mergers prohibited outright by the Commission under the Merger Regulation since it came into force in 1990, three have been in the
media sector. In the European Community, there have been no
general rules keeping separate the telephone, cable, and broadcasting industries, although there have been telecommunications monopolies and broadcasting monopolies.
Few of the Commission's decisions in high technology industries show any novel or unusual features from an antitrust law
viewpoint. The summary that follows calls attention essentially
to the recognition by the Commission of some of the special features of these industries. If it were thought desirable that Community antitrust law should adopt substantially altered approaches for these industries, they are not yet visible. In fact,
many of the cases involve issues arising from new technologies
rather than sophisticated technologies. The fact that an industry
is sophisticated does not mean that every antitrust case arising in
29
it raises sophisticated antitrust issues.
Commission decisions in high technology industries are
now more and more preceded by a large number of comments
from competitors and others with interests opposed, to a greater
or lesser extent, to those of the parties to the agreements in
question (i.e. there were twelve third parties represented at the
MSG hearing). This was not the case in the past. One would
29. See, e.g. Commission Reg. No. 3423/82, O.J. L 360/30, (1982); British Tecorm,
[1985] E.C.R. at 873, [1985] 2 C.M.L.R at 368.
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expect a greater degree of sophistication to result. Most of the
cases summarized below date from 1990 or later. Only a few earlier cases are important for the purposes of this Article.
1. Telecommunications, Media, and Electronics Cases
a. IGR Stereo Television-Salora
In the IGR Stereo Television-Salora case in 1981,30 the patents
needed for making TV sets specially equipped for stereo reception of Germany TV were held by IGR, a company owned by all
the firms manufacturing color TV sets in Germany. IGR granted
licenses to these manufacturers, but decided to license nonmembers only after a certain date and for a limited number of
sets. IGR then used its patent rights to prevent Salora, a Finnish
company, from supplying stereo TV sets to two large mail order
firms in Germany. Salora was, therefore, being prevented from
supplying any of the special sets at a time when the new stereo
sets were being launched on the German market. Salora requested interim measures that the Commission has the power to
order in appropriate cases.5 1
IGR agreed to grant licenses immediately and provide them
free of restrictions as to quantity.
The points to note are:
" TV sets with other types of stereo receivers would not have
been compatible with German TV transmission;
" Under Article 85 of the EC Treaty, IGR and its members
would not have been permitted to shut Salora out of the
German market while exploiting it themselves. If necessary, the Commission would have ordered compulsory licensing by IGR;
* IGR and its members may well have been in a joint dominant position and, thus, under Article 86 of the EC Treaty.
There was no competition between them in the relevant
30. IGR Stereo Television, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, ELvENH
REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1981, at 63-64, § 94 (1982) [hereinafter IGR]. Cf.,
United States v. General Electric Co., 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.NJ. 1953).
31. Camera Care Ltd. v. Commission, Case 792/79 R, [1980] E.C.R. 119, [1980] 1
C.M.L.R. 334; Ford Werke v. Commission,Joined cases 228-229/82, [1984] E.C.R. 1129,
[1984] 1 C.M.L.R. 649; ORTIZ BLANco, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COMPETITION PROCEDuRE 283-93 (1996); John Temple Lang, The Powers of the Commission to Order Interim
Measures in Competition Cases, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 49 (1981); John Temple Lang,
Procedure in Community Competition Cases - Some Recent Developments, in XI INTERNATIONALES EG-KARTELLRECHTSFORUM 94, 94-97 (1986).
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respect.32 Even if that was so, the practical result would
have been the same, in the circumstances of this case,
under Article 85;
" If IGR had been ajoint venture owning any other essential
prerequisite for participation in the market, the result
would have been the same: the fact that the prerequisite
was a patent did not influence the outcome;5 ? and
" Although in general there is no duty to supply under Article 85, there is a duty when a discriminatory refusal has
sufficiently serious anticompetitive effects.
b. Corning-OpticalFibers
In the Coming-OpticalFibres decision,' the Commission authorized joint venture agreements between Coming, which invented optical fibers for telecommunication, and several cable
producers. The Commission considered that the principal restrictions on competition were due to the relationship between
the joint ventures, each of which was to produce and sell optical
fibers and each of which was licensed by Corning. The joint ventures, therefore, brought together companies with strong positions in the cable market with one company with a strong position in the optical fibers market. The joint ventures were dependent technologically on Corning. The agreements, however,
were exempted because they made possible a quick conversion
to optical fibers and optical cables. Competition from within
and outside the European Community would continue. Users
would benefit from the availability of new products at lower
prices. A detailed analysis was made of the indispensability of
the various clauses.
c. X/Open Group
The Commission's X/Open Group decision 5 concerned an
agreement to set up an open industry standard by selecting existing interfaces for use with AT&T's Unix. Competition was restricted because both the criteria and the procedures for admit32. John Temple Lang, European Community Antitrust Law and Joint Ventures Involving Transfer of Technology, in 1982 FORDHAM CoRP. L. INST. 203 (Barry Hawk ed., 1983).
33. John Temple Lang, Trade Associations and Self Regulation under EEC Antitrust
Law, in 1984 FoRDHAm CoRP. L. INsr. 605, 650-62 (Barry Hawk ed., 1985).
34. Commission Decision No. 86/405, O.J. L 236/30 (1986).
35. Commission Decision No. 87/69, O.J. L 35/36 (1987).
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ting new members meant that membership was not open to all
interested companies. Members would be able to implement
standards before they were publicly known, and non-members
would be, therefore, at a competitive disadvantage. The Commission, however, accepted that the agreement would ultimately
encourage independent software houses to develop application
programs. Much weight was given to the parties' intentions to
make their results available as quickly as possible and to the fact
that users would become less dependent on hardware manufacturers for their applications software.
There are two points worth noting about X/Open Group.
First, the exemption was given for only four years from the date
of the decision. Second, conditions were imposed to ensure that
the Commission was informed if membership was refused.
d. Alcatel/ANT
In Alcatel Espace/ANT, 6 the Commission authorized an research and development specialization and marketing agreement on space electronic equipment in the field of civil radio,
broadcasting satellites, and data transmission via satellites. Alcatel is a manufacturer of communication equipment and systems and ANT was a leading German company in telecommunication technology. Their combined turnover was less than that
of several other European manufacturers and much smaller
than some non-European companies. It is important to note
that the authorization did not extend to any extensions in the
scope of the agreement. In addition, the Commission stressed
that Community manufacturers were competing only at the subsystem level, while for example, manufacturers in the United
States, where the number of space projects was higher than in
the European Community, were producing complete satellites.
e. Konsortium ECR 900
In Konsortium ECR 900,"7 the Commission authorized Alcatel, Nokia, and AEG, to introduce a pan-European public digital cellular mobile telecommunications service called GSM. Several factors influenced the Commission. European phone net36. Commission Decision No. 90/46,

O.J.

L 32/19 (1990); see Alcatel/Teletra,

O.J. 122/48 (1991).
37. Commission Decision No. 90/446, O.J. L 228/31 (1990).

1997]

COMMUNITY ANTITRUST LAW

work operators had agreed on the interfaces for the system. The
buyers were the network operators, and there were a number of
other European suppliers. The invitations to tender from the
telecom administrations had set tight deadlines, and the partners could not have met them separately. Nor could the partners have financed the cost in a short time.
f. Screensport-EuropeanBroadcasting Union
In Screensport-EuropeanBroadcastingUnion,3 8 the Commission
refused to allow an agreement that would have eliminated competition in sports broadcasting between some of the public
broadcasting companies ("Eurosport") and Sky TV, owned by
Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation. The agreement would
have provided much greater access to sports programs for members of Eurosport, including programs obtained through EBU.
Other commercial sports channels would have had much less
favorable arrangements. Eurosport would have strengthened
the negotiating position of its members and would have distorted competition in cable TV in favor of Sky. The ill effects on
competition outweighed the benefit of a new transnational
sports channel. An alliance between members of the EBU and
their principal competitor was not indispensable. Sky was going
to broadcast many sports events anyway. This case is linked to
the Eurovision case. 9
g. °Eirpage
In Eirpage,4 ° the Commission authorized, subject to conditions, an agreement between the Irish Telecommunications
Company ("ITC") and Motorola to set up a joint venture for a
paging system interconnected to the public telecom network.
The parent companies' skills were complementary. Motorola
had experience with equipment and paging services, and ITC
had the communications network. Paging devices are smaller,
more convenient, and cheaper than mobile phones and send
messages one-way only; they are a different market. The parent
companies were potential competitors. The deal was to set up a
paging service that covered rural areas not previously covered,
38. Commission Decision No. 91/130, O.J. L 63/32 (1991).
39. Commission Decision No. 93/403, O.J. L 179/23 (1993).
40. Commission Decision No. 91/562, O.J. L 306/22 (1991).
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and these benefits could not have been obtained as quickly or to
the same extent without the joint venture. Motorola by itself
would not have been as concerned with ensuring country-wide
coverage or maximum compatibility with the existing phone system, so consumers in less populated areas benefitted from the
cooperation. It was a public service issue.
There are several points worth noting. First, Telecom was
required to make available to Eirpage's competitors all the facilities it was giving to Eirpage on the same terms. Second, subscribers' contracts were for one year only, so they could switch.
Furthermore, the paging market was directly influenced by developments in portable radios and mobile phones although they
were separate markets. Finally, in an Article 85 case, the Commission once again imposed a condition obliging the parent
companies of ajoint venture to give its competitors similar treatment in the future, without proof of a dominant position and
without proof that either parent had already discriminated in
favor of the joint venture.
h. Astra
In its Astra decision,4" the Commission refused an exemption for an agreement on marketing and provision of TV broadcasting services by satellite between British Telecom and SES, a
company set up to operate satellites. The agreement restricted
competition in the markets for satellite transponder capacity
and for uplink services, sending signals up to satellites. The two
companies were direct competitors in both markets. The Commission said the arrangements were not indispensable and that
the agreements produced no benefits and required the parties
to notify companies with which they had made contracts that
they were free to terminate or renegotiate them.
i. Auditel
In Auditel,4 2 the Commission prohibited a joint audiencemeasurement system that was to be used in Italy exclusively to
avoid "rating wars" and resulting arguments over rates charged
for advertising. The Commission did not allow the parties to be
41. Commission Decision No. 93/50, O.J. L 20/23 (1993). This decision is on
appeal.
42. Commission Decision No. 93/668, O.J. L 306/50 (1993).
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prohibited from using figures from other sources. The restriction was not indispensable to obtain the advantages the system
could provide, and too much competition would have been eliminated. The decision was adopted to clarify the legal position for
the future.
j.Infonet
The Commission approved an agreement called Infonet43
between the French, German, Spanish, Belgian, and Dutch
Telecom enterprises and MCI and several other non-European
telecom corporations. Infonet provides global network services
on a one-stop-shop basis, including data communications, electronic mail ("E-mail"), electronic data interchange, and videotex
services. Its data communications services are operated on the
basis of an international packet switched network constructed
largely with lines leased from its members. The Commission obtained undertakings from the European telecom enterprises not
to cross-subsidize or discriminate in favor of Infonet and against
its competitors and to deal with Infonet on an arms-length basis.
Recording and reporting obligations were imposed accordingly.
k. BT/MCI
In the BT/MCI decision,' the Commission authorized British Telecom ("BT") to take a twenty percent share in MCI and a
joint venture that would be exclusively represented in the European Community by BT. The aim was to provide global "valueadded" telecommunications services to world-wide companies.
These include virtual network services, high-speed data services,
and intelligent network and traveler services. A number of other
large companies were beginning to supply these services. The
joint venture restricted competition between the parent companies. As is often the case, the parent companies had different
motives; MCI wanted to maintain and extend its position especially in the Americas while BT wanted to become a world-wide
provider of value-added and enhanced telecom services and
needed a partner, particularly in the United States. The Com43. Commission Notice, OJ. C 7/3 (1992);

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMU-

1992, at 416 (1993).
44. Commission Decision No. 94/579, OJ. L 223/36 (1994). COMMISSION

NITIES, XXIID REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIVTH

§§ 156-60 (1995).

REPORT ON COMPETITION

POLICY

OF THE

1994, at 102-04,

738

FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 20:717

mission concluded that the joint venture would inject new services into the world market much faster than either parent company could separately. The Commission added that it was important to have a full range of services available quickly. It was
crucial to the approval that both parties guaranteed access to
their networks to third parties on a non-discriminatory basis.
1. Olivetti-Digital
The Commission authorized agreements between Olivetti
and Digital4 5 for production of components for computer systems. The Commission stated that the relevant markets were
those for reduced instruction set computer technology ("RISC")
and for the computer system products incorporating it. Olivetti
committed itself to use Digital's technology and to make substantial purchases from Digital. Olivetti, however, had no RISC technology, and its five year commitment did not restrict competition more than is inherent in any choice of a temporary partner
and supplier. The effect was to make Olivetti a competitor in
RISC products without limiting Digital's freedom to exploit its
technology in the European Community. The deal was approved because it allowed a more rapid dissemination of Digital's advanced RISC technology and because there were other
RISC technologies available.
m. MSG Media Service
MSG Media Service4 concerned a joint venture to handle
payment-financed digital pay-TV, cable, or satellite. Pay-TV requires a decoder to enable subscribers to receive the encrypted
programs for which they are paying, conditional-access technology, and a subscriber management system. Decoders require
substantial investment. Because most households in the European Community still have analog TV sets, they need converters
that allow the new digital signal to be received in analog form.
The combined decoder and converter were to be in a set-top
"box." In Europe, the encryption systems are proprietary. The
Commission explained that cable TV is a separate market and
refused to consider cable, satellite, and terrestrial frequencies as
45. Commission Decision No. 94/771, O.J. L 309/24 (1994).
46. Commission Decision No. 94/922/EC, OJ. L 364/1 (1994) [hereinafter MSG
Media Service].
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a single market because of the technical and financial differences between them. The Commission considered that the proposed joint venture would create "a durable dominant position"
in Germany in the market for technical and administrative services, and this would create a dominant position for Bertelsmann,
a book and sound recording group, and Kirch, a film and TV
program producer, with the German Telecommunications monopoly Deutsche Telekom ("DT") in the pay-TV market. DT's
position as a cable network operator would also be strengthened.
The merger was prohibited, and the parties did not appeal.
Points to note about the MSG Media Service case are:
* The case is a good example of a proposed alliance between a state telecommunications enterprise, a TV and
film company, and a book, sound recording, and music
publisher in a national market;
" The combination of complementary companies would
have foreclosed future and emerging markets and greatly
raised barriers to entry for competitors;
" Pay-TV was considered a market separate from both public TV, financed through fees and advertising, and freeaccess TV, financed by commercial advertising. Pay-TV involves a relationship between viewers and the program
suppliers, and commercially financed TV is based on the
links between the program supplier and advertisers. The
Commission's decision expressly said that this distinction
47
might become blurred in the future;
" Digitalization allows a huge increase in transmission capacity, from some thirty channels to approximately 200
channels.4 8 This will allow new payment-financed special
interest channels to emerge;
* Digitalization combined with encoded cable or telephone
networks allow the development of interactive TV services
such as pay-per-view and video-on-demand, as well as
home banking and shopping, and teleteaching, which
would be separate markets;
" The Commission stated that "a monopoly in a future market that is onlyjust beginning to develop should not necessarily be regarded49 as a dominant position" within the
Merger Regulation;
47. Id. at 6, § 32.
48. Id. at 6-7, § 33.
49. Id. at 10-11, § 55.
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* One of the main concerns was the barrier to entry created
by the development of a standard for encryption and decoding for digital TV by a company that, due to the
merger, would be involved in downstream activities. Decoders are so expensive that it is not likely that a household will want to pay for two in the future. MSG's proposed undertakings on decoders were not enough to deal
with this;
• Digital encrypted TV, thus, involves significant first mover
advantages;
* In response to the argument that the parties could not
undertake the investment involved separately, the Commission said that DT, Bertelsmann, and Kirch could have
done so and that two mobile telephone system operators
had set up in Germany;
" The pay-TV market would lead into the markets for interactive higher-value services. DT's network was the only
channel currently available for interactive TV;
" A combination of the strengths of DT, Bertelsmann, and
Kirch would have made it almost impossible for a competitor to enter the market;
* By jointly operating the pay-TV structure with the leading
German pay-TV suppliers, DT would strengthen its position as a cable network operator. Each partner by the
agreement would eliminate the risk of competition from
the others; and
* Behavioral undertakings were considered insufficient to
avoid the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.
n. InternationalPrivate Satellite Partners
The MSG Media Service decision contrasts with the Commission's negative clearance decision to allow the creation of International Private Satellite Partners. 0 This was ajoint venture of a
number of partners to provide international business telecommunications services to multinational companies on a one-stopshop "end-to-end" basis, to operate satellites for this purpose,
and to offer spare capacity on the market for bulk satellite transmission. The Commission said that no partner alone could meet
the requirements or undertake the investment. The Commis50. OJ. L 354/75 (1994);
PORT ON COMPETITION POLICY

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

1993, at 133, § 217 (1994).
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sion noted that the joint venture would be a new competitor in
the telecommunications market previously reserved to companies holding exclusive rights.
o. Microsoft Consent Decree
In 1994, the Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice negotiated joindy with Microsoft and obtained an undertaking51 and a consent decree in identical terms. Microsoft undertook not to make licenses of more than one year's duration, not
to impose minimum commitments on licensees, and not to use
"per processor" licenses requiring payment of a royalty on every
computer containing a particular processor, regardless of
whether it was shipped with pre-installed Microsoft software.
"Per system" licenses, royalties payable on every computer in a
particular model series, are allowed only if licensees are clearly
free to buy non-Microsoft products without paying royalties to
Microsoft. Existing licenses not fulfilling these requirements
were not to be enforced, and could be terminated by the licen52
sees, as in the Astra decision.
p. Nordic Satellite
In 1995, the Commission prohibited the Nordic Satellite
Distribution merger.5" This was a joint venture between Kinnevik, a private Swedish conglomerate with strong TV, media,
and telecom interests and the Danish and Norwegian stateowned telecom companies. The joint venture would have provided transponder capacity to broadcasters, operated cable TV,
and transmitted satellite TV to the Nordic market. All transponder capacity on the two main competing satellites was already
utilized, neither had a special interest in the Nordic area, and
broadcasters would be likely to reduce their use of one of the
satellites. Because of its links with Kinnevik as a major distribu51. O.J. L 53/20 (1996); COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIVTH
REPORT ON COMPETITION PoUcy 1994, at 364-65 (1995). See John Temple Lang, Air
Transport in the EEC - Community Antitrust Law Aspects, in 1991 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST.
287, 368-89 (Barry Hawk, ed., 1992) (detailing legal effects of undertakings in Community law).

52. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (describing Astra decision).
53. Commission Decision No. 96/17/EC, O.J. L 53/20 (1996), COMMISSION OF THE
EUROPEAN

(1996).

COMMUNITIES,

XXVTH REPORT ON COMPETITION Poucy 1995, at 173-74
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tor and because thejoint venture would control Nordic cable TV
networks, the Commission concluded that it would have a dominant position on the market for satellite TV transponder services
for Nordic viewers. Kinnevik would also get a dominant position
on the market for distribution direct to home of satellite pay-TV.
Vertical integration did not offer technical progress sufficient to
outweigh the effects on competition. Undertakings offered by
the parties were not considered sufficient, among other reasons
because several of them were too difficult to enforce. The vertical integration meant that the positions of the parties in various
markets would reinforce each other. In particular, their positions in the downstream cable TV networks and distribution
markets would reinforce the dominance on transponders by deterring potential competitors from broadcasting from other
transponders into the Nordic area.
There are several notable points in the Nordic Satellite case.
First, like MSG Media Service, the problem concerned excessive
vertical integration which was considered likely to lead to the
exclusion of competitors at all levels. Vertical links between
companies that are dominant at different levels, in this case, production and transmission of TV programs, are always going to be
looked at critically. Second, like MSG Media Service, the parties
would have had control over decoding equipment in private
homes, which would have created serious barriers to entry for
other competitors. Third, it was a significant case of involvement of telecommunications companies in the TV sector.
Fourth, the efficiency defense, as in MSG Media Service, was explicitly rejected.
q. RTL-Veronica-Endemol
Another important recent case in which the Commission
prohibited a merger was RTL-Veronica-Endemol.V4 RTL and Veronica are broadcasting companies, and Endemol produces TV
programs. The Commission looked at three related markets, TV
broadcasting, advertising on TV, and producing Dutch TV programs. Thejoint venture would reach an audience market share
equal to or greater than the public broadcasting companies,
would probably generate at least sixty percent of TV advertising,
54. RTL-Veronica-Endemol, 0.J. L 134/32 (1995),
COMMUNITIES, XXVTH REPORT ON COMPETITION

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN

PoLIcv 1995, at 174-75 (1996).
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and would be able to counteract the actions of competitors. The
joint venture had agreed to take a minimum quantity of programs from Endemol. "A participation of 23% in a company
that is active in a downstream market has to be seen as a strategic
participation, rather than a financial one,"55 especially when
combined with representation on the board of the joint venture.
Endemol would, thus, be able to foreclose access by other program producers to the largest broadcaster in the Netherlands.
Not surprisingly, the merger was prohibited, although some undertakings were offered.
The parties later modified their plans, and the Commission
finally approved them.56 Endemol had withdrawn from the joint
venture and joined a consortium setting up a new sports channel. Under the new arrangements, RTL would receive sixty five
percent of the joint venture and Veronica would receive thirty
five percent. The joint venture gave undertakings to operate
what had been a general interest channel in the future as a news
channel that would become a pay-TV channel generating its revenue from viewers or cable operators. This would make the part
of the market previously cared for by that general interest channel available to competitors and reduce the joint venture's share
of the Dutch TV advertising market.
r. ETSI Interim Intellectual Property Rights Polity
The ETSI Interim Intellectual Property Rights Policy case 57 concerned the intellectual property rights arrangements developed
by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute
("ETSI"). The application of a Community standard could be
made impossible if the standard incorporated proprietary technology and the owner of that technology was not willing to license it to the manufacturers of products complying with the
standard. In the area of telecommunications, Community standards must be used in connection with the mutual recognition
for type approval of terminal equipment and for public procurement procedures by telecommunications operators. Equipment
manufacturers would be foreclosed from the market if licenses
55. RTL-Veronica-Endemol, 0J. L 134/32 (1995).
56. Commission Decision No. 96/649/EC, 0.J. L. 294/14 (1996).
57. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXVTH REPORT ON COMPETITION

Poucv 1995, at 131-32 (1996).
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for such technology were not available. In order to reduce the
risk of the development of standards being wasted, ETSI
adopted a policy requiring that members would agree in advance to allow their intellectual property rights ("IPRs") to be
included in a given ETSI standard, unless the IPR owner had
identified any IPR it wished to withhold within a fixed period;
this is the "licensing-by-default" obligation. In addition, the policy contained a number of provisions regarding the terms of the
licenses to be granted unless the licensee agreed to grant crosslicenses.
Under pressure from the Commission, ETSI modified its
policy so that ETSI members were obliged to use "reasonable
efforts" to inform ETSI in a timely manner if they become aware
of IPRs being developed in a given standard. If a member is
unwilling to grant licenses, ETSI will seek a viable alternative
technology, and if no alternative is found, work on that standard
will cease. Members will merely be required to explain in writing the reasons for refusing to license. Once ETSI becomes
aware of any IPRs in a particular standard, it will ask the owner,
member or non-member of ETSI, whether it is prepared to grant
irrevocable non-exclusive licenses on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms and conditions. A refusal to do so may lead
to the non-recognition of the standard in question. There are,
thus, no provisions relating to compulsory or automatic licensing or to specific licensing terms.
s. SiemnsItaltel
In Siemens/Italtel,58 the Commission authorized the merger
of the Siemens subsidiary for the manufacture of telecommunications equipment and the manufacturing subsidiary of the
STET group in telecommunications equipment. STET controls
the Italian public telecom operator, Telecom Italia.
Initially, the Commission considered that the proposed operation raised both horizontal and vertical issues in the markets
of public telecommunication equipment. Horizontally, the joint
venture would hold a substantial share of the public switching
and transmission equipment market in Italy because Italtel's
sales were basically restricted to Italy. Vertically, the Siemens/
Italtel joint venture would be partially owned by its major cus58. Id. at 172-73.
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tomer. Finally, the Commission took into consideration the fact

that the markets for telecommunications equipment were being
transformed. In particular, the Commission considered the potential for technological developments to make significant
changes, the effects of standardization and public procurement
legislation in opening up national markets, and the liberalization of telecommunications services and, in particular, telecommunications infrastructures that will lead progressively to a
world-wide market for public telecommunications equipment.
In mobile communications, a Community standard, the liberalization of services, and the liberalization of infrastructures,
has resulted in a European, if not world-wide, market for the
supply of telecommunication equipment. In relation to the vertical link, any benefits that could arise from Telecom Italia granting privileges to the joint venture would be shared with Siemens.
Siemens would have gained direct influence only over the equipment supplier, Italtel, and would have had no influence over the
buyers, the telecom operator, Telecom Italia, or over its parent,
STET. STET gave assurances that it would not interfere in the
purchasing policy of Telecom Italia, in particular with regard to
the choice of suppliers, and that there would be a clear separation between the management of Telecom Italia and the companies of the Italtel group.
t. Atlas Phoenix/Global One
The Commission's decisions on Atlas Phoenix/Global One5 9
are its most elaborate so far. The Commission approved the strategic alliances between France Telecom, Deutsche Telecom, and
Sprint-Global One, under Article 85 (3) as structural cooperative
joint ventures.'
The new joint venture, Phoenix, is to enter the markets for
corporate telecom services, traveler services (services for individuals away from their home base, for example, calling card services and selected data and communications system software services) and carrier services (transmission capacity). Both France
Telecom and Deutsche Telecom still have certain monopoly
59. Id. at § 57; Commission Decision No. 96/547/EC, O.J. L 239/23 (1995) [hereinafter Atlas Phoenix/Global One]; see Eucom/Digital, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNrMES, XXID REPORT ON COMPETITION PoUcY 1993, at 121-22 (1994).
60. Atlas Phoenix/Global One, O.J. L 239/23, at 39-41, 50-51 (1996).
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rights in France and Germany, respectively. The Commission
prohibited them from discriminating in favor of Phoenix and
against any competitors of Phoenix needing services from them.
The decisions came into force only when the first competitors
were licensed to provide telecom infrastructure in competition
with France Telecom and Deutsche Telecom. The decision includes elaborate and detailed requirements against discrimination, cross-subsidization, and bundling of reserved and non-reserved services and sets forth accounting and auditing requirements to prove compliance with the substantive obligations.
2. Pharmaceutical, Chemical, and Biotechnology Cases
a. Becton Dickinson/Cyclopore
In 1993, the Commission approved an agreement between
Beckton Dickinson and Cyclopore. 6 ' Cyclopore is closely linked
to the University of Louvain and produces thin membranes
based on a patent license from the University. Becton developed
a technique to weld these membranes into tissue culture products for culturing mammalian and insect cells in vitro. The
Commission allowed reciprocal exclusive buying and selling obligations for five years, after which Cyclopore is free to sell membranes to other buyers.
b. PasteurMrieux-Merck
In a decision on vaccines, PasteurMdrieux-Merck, the Commission authorized a research and development joint venture
and some related agreements between two European pharmaceutical companies. The principal restrictive effects were on potential competition and on third parties who would be licensed
in the future only through the joint venture. The companies are
two of the three leading vaccine producers world-wide. The
Commission authorized the agreements on the grounds that the
only alternatives would have involved multiple partners and
been less satisfactory. In a long and detailed decision, the Commission concluded that an exemption should be given for twelve
years.
61.

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIIID REPORT ON COMPETITION

POLIcy 1993, at 160, § 241 (1994).
62. Commission Decision No. 94/770/EC,
teur Mrieux-Merck].

OJ. L 309/1

(1994) [hereinafter Pas-
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PasteurMbieux-Merck is particularly notable on two accounts.
First, the Commission, rightly or wrongly, gave weight to the likelihood of future competition from other sources, in spite of the
short-term restrictions. This was crucial to the authorization.
(This was an exemption under Article 85(3), and so could not
be given permanently). Second, thejoint structure would be the
first entity with access to the technology needed to develop certain new multivalent vaccines, so that the availability of these
new vaccines in Europe would be accelerated.
c. Exxon-Shell
Exxon-Shell,6"

the Commission gave a ten year exemption
In
for a joint venture to produce linear low-density polyethylene
which would continue to be produced by both parent companies. This would be the first plant of its kind in the European
Community and should lead to customers converting to this
product, a reduction in the customers' use of raw materials, a
reduction in their costs, and a diminished production of plastic
wastes. The Commission insisted on considerable flexibility in
the operation of the joint venture, and there were reasons for
believing that there would continue to be competition between
the parents in the sale of the product, because of different raw
material costs for each parent and because of separate marketing. The parties together had only twenty-two percent of the
Community market.
d. Shell-Montecatini
In Shell-Montecatini," the Commission agreed to the setting
up of ajoint venture that would have created dominant positions
in the world market for licensing the technology for producing
polypropylene and in the West European market for
polypropylene itself. More than two-thirds of the world production used one or other of the two parent companies' technologies, and the other technologies were not considered adequate.
The Commission considered that the parties would have onethird of Community polypropylene production, competitors
63. Commission Decision No. 94/322/EC, OJ. L 144/20 (1994) [hereinafter Exxon/Shell].
64. Commission Decision No. 94/811/EC, OJ. L 332/48 (1994) [hereinafter
Shell-Montecatini].
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were relatively weak, the parties were also in several other
polypropylene joint ventures, and the joint venture would own
the technology. The Commission, however, approved the arrangement on the basis of two undertakings. Montedison's technology activities would not be put into the joint venture but
would remain under the sole control of Montedison and would
operate independently with sufficient resources to finance R&D.
Also, Montedison would withdraw from its production joint venture with Petrofina and simultaneously keep its activities and
know-how entirely separate from those of the new Shell-Montecatini joint venture. It is worth noting that the Commission objected because the new joint venture would have controlled both
of the principal technologies. Keeping one technology under
the sole control of one parent would not normally be sufficient
to solve this problem. The Commission defined a relevant product market for technology.
e. Upjohn-Pharmacia
6 5 the Commission
In Upjohn-Pharmacia,
considered R&D
competition in the pharmaceutical industry. The Commission
first explained that for medium sized companies, the cost of
R&D and regulatory approval for pharmaceuticals are "becoming very heavy to bear."66 Pooling resources would create "critical mass."6 7 But the Commission still looked at R&D activities
and concluded that although their research on solid tumors concerned the same class of compounds, they were not sure to overlap and there were competing compounds from three other
large competitors. Pharmacia's compound needed several years
of clinical trials before its therapeutic profile became known.
Though the two companies' research on Parkinson's disease
overlapped, there were at least twelve competing products under
development by major companies. Therefore, neither area of
R&D overlap raised competition concerns.

f. Glaxo-Wellcome
The Commission authorized the Glaxo-Wellcome pharma65. Commission Decision, Case No. IV/M.631,
66. Id. at § 25.
67. Id.

OJ.

C 294/09 (1995).
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ceutical merger in 1995.68 Both companies were doing research
on antimigraine products, and Wellcome's new product was
likely to compete with Glaxo's new and existing products. To
solve the problem, Glaxo agreed to grant an exclusive license to
a third party to develop and market one of the two new drugs.
Two points should be highlighted. First, this divestiture was crucial. The Commission noted that other competitors were doing
R&D on drugs with similar modes of action, but that these might
not be on the market before the year 2000. Second, the Commission did not wish to express a view on which new product was
likely to succeed, and, therefore, treated them all equally. This
led it to say implicitly that if Wellcome was not successful, the
disappearance of Wellcome's future product as a competitor to
Glaxo was not important, but that if they were all successful
Glaxo would have competition. The risk that the Commission
was taking (that the competitors' products would not appear,
and that Wellcome's product would be valuable) could only be
dealt with by the exclusive license that Glaxo promised.
g. The Aspen Case
The Aspen case 69 involved the creation of a joint venture in
the field of specialty polyethylene resins and compounds. The
Commission considered whether there was any likely decrease in
competition on the polyethylene technology licensing market
arising from the operation. While Elf Atochem might have been
a future competitor to Union Carbide ("UCC") in this market,
this was judged to be so unlikely that any effects on this market
were outweighed by the procompetitive effects in the polyethylene markets.
The Commission authorized a joint venture between
Enichem and Union Carbide7 ° in the market for polyethylene
("PE"). Enichem transferred to the joint venture, with some exceptions, its Western European manufacturing facilities and
68. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXVTH REPORT ON COMPETITION
PoLicy 1995, at 163-64 (1996); see Glaxo, C 3586, June 14, 1995, 60 Fed. Reg. 16-139
(Mar. 29, 1995); see also Commission Decision No. 96/478/EC, O.J. L 201/1, at § 150-52
(1996) [hereinafter Adalat].

69. Commission Decision No. 95/C, O.J. C 123/3 (1995) [hereinafter Aspen],
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXVTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POuCY

1995, at 123-24 (1996).
70. Id.
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sales network. UCC contributed its technological expertise, including a license to use its production process. UCC is the leading world supplier of PE production technology. The Commission examined the effects of the proposed operation on, among
other markets, the market for PE production technology. The
Commission concluded that the operation would not create or
strengthen a dominant position in any of these markets. In the
PE technology market, there are four types of PE production
processes that are currently used, distinguished by the method
by which ethylene is polymerized. Potential licensees for PE
technology will seek licenses for low pressure processes, such as
gas phase, that produce more than one product. The capability
of a technology to switch production at a single plant is important for some potential licensees. UCC's technology is the leading gas-phase PE process. The Commission concluded, however,
that the creation of the joint venture would not significantly improve UCC's position in the technology because Enichem's experience was only, to a very limited extent, in gas-phase technology.
h. Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz
In its Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz decision, 7 1 the Commission authorized a merger setting up the second largest supplier in the world
of pharmaceutical products. The decision analyzed specifically
"future markets," that is, products that are not yet on the market
but that are at an advanced stage of development. According to
the Commission:
The Commission has to look at R&D potential in terms of its
importance for existing markets, but also for future markets
.... Insofar as research and development must be assessed in
terms of its importance for future markets, the relevant product market must, in the nature of things, be defined in a less
clear-cut manner than in the case of existing markets ....
Because research and development is normally global, the
consideration of future markets should therefore focus on
the territory of the Community at least, and possibly on
world-wide markets.
The decision later states:
The market strength of the undertakings in research and de71. Adopted on July 17, 1996 (decision not reported).
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velopment is difficult to estimate since success in R&D can
usually be assessed only after the R&D has been completed.
Nevertheless, the undertakings' existing R&D potential cannot be ignored in the competitive assessment since their future competitive strength is based precisely on such potential.
The parties are particularly strong in the biotechnology
and genetic engineering fields. Their strength is based primarily on a number of cooperation agreements with and
stakes in U.S. undertakings and research establishments.
Through these holdings and cooperative arrangements, the
parties also have access to patents in this field ....

Little can

be said with certainty about the time required to achieve results in this area [gene therapy]. Since the diseases to be
treated are as a rule ones that hitherto could not be adequately treated, authorization of developed processes can
possibly be given much more quickly than in the case of traditional medicinal products that merely replace ones that are
already available and effective.
The parties could, as a result of these holdings, have exclusive access to a combination of broadly defined patents
.... The patent applications cover such a wide spectrum of
patent claims that, if the patents are issued with the coverage
applied for or with similar coverage, their combination as a
result of the merger could mean that other competitors were
largely excluded from parts of this field of research (gene
therapy for brain tumors ...

).

Patents rights may pose considerable entry barriers to
competitors on future markets. When R&D results are marketed, a number of patents held by other undertakings must
often be taken into account. Undertakings must then either
find ways of marketing their R&D results without infringing
other patent rights or acquire the relevant licenses. The
more patents exist in a particular area of research and the
wider the coverage of such patents, the more difficult the situation may be in individual cases. Particular problems may
arise where individual suppliers have a combination of patents that make it difficult or indeed impossible for other suppliers to gain market access without infringing such patents,
Where a merger leads to the holding of such a combination
of patents, market foreclosure can result.
The parties argue that some at least of the patent applications, in particular those attributable to Chiron, are so
broadly formulated that it is highly improbable that they will
be granted without a more detailed specification. Further-
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more, they argue, the patents attributable to Chiron, as currently specified, do not cover the treatment of brain tumors
and other tumors. They therefore take the view that, even if
the relevant patents are granted, the proposed merger will
not lead to any combining of patents that might result in market foreclosure. Lastly, the parties object that they do not
have any exclusive access to the patents attributable to Chiron.
According to information deriving from the market, any
combining of the future patent rights of GTI and Viagen
could block the development of gene therapies for tumors or
other treatment methods by other undertakings. It is still uncertain whether this situation will actually apply. At any rate,
the merger can place competitors in a worse negotiating position for obtaining a license from GTI or Chiron after the
merger. Whether this worsening of competitors' negotiating
positions can actually result in market dominance depends
essentially on three conditions: (1) it is not certain that gene
therapy will ultimately prove to be a successful method of
treatment; (2) other research results may open up ways of circumventing any obstacle created by the combining of patents;
and (3) the patent situation is very unclear. The parties have
as yet submitted only patent applications. Patents have still to
be granted.
If these three conditions become reality, the proposed
merger may lead to a structural danger of foreclosure of the
future market for HS-TK gene therapies for tumors The parties would then have power over other competitors' market
access through the issue of licenses.
The first condition is one that applies in any examination of future markets. What it ultimately amounts to is that
the market must be created before any problem can arise ....
Even if it cannot yet be predicted whether this new method
for treating tumors will actually be applied, there is nevertheless, in view of the progress being made in the research, sufficient probability to warrant protecting the market in terms of
competition.
The second condition is difficult to assess in current
terms. Insofar as the parties' competitors may in future be
prevented from marketing their products as a result of patents, they will, in view of the large amounts of expenditure
incurred on research, try to find a way of circumventing this
difficulty if they cannot obtain any licenses. There is not
enough information available to be able to say whether such a
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way will be found. Although any such endeavor can involve
additional time and money, it cannot be excluded that competitors will search and find such ways.
A key question regarding the creation of any competition problem is whether the parties will obtain patents that
may have a blocking effect. This applies primarily to the
blocking effect that patent applications attributable to Chiron
may create for competitors of GTI in their pursuit of a competing product. The Commission's investigations have identified substantial market fears in this respect. The granting of
such patents depends on two preconditions. First, the parties
must assert their patent claims on the basis of a specification
that includes areas of HS-TK gene therapy for tumors. This
precondition is solely in the hands of the parties. To this extent, the proposed merger can pose an increased structural
danger of market foreclosure. The second precondition is
the actual granting of such patents, and this is not in the
hands of the parties. The patent applications could of course
exert some disruptive effect. Undertakings wishing to market
a HS-TK gene therapy for tumors would have to bear in mind
that, under certain circumstances, patents having a broad
specification might be granted. They are therefore confronted with the question of whether they should carry out
investment in this area at all and whether they would have
seek a way of getting round any patent. Viewed in abstract
terms, this could pose an obstacle to competitors wishing to
gain market assess.
Therefore, it cannot ultimately be said with sufficient
probability that the merger will on any future market lead to
72
the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.
The companies undertook to arrange the granting of nonexclusive licenses to requesting third parties at commercially
competitive terms under any European patent (and resulting national patents) based on the international patent applications,
ten years from the granting of the European patents for each of
these patents. The parties gave a similar undertaking in relation
to Methoprene.73
Later in the decision, the Commission several times considered "potential competition" for products already on the market, i.e. new entrants, making it clear that there is a difference
72. Id. at
73. Id. at

95 et seq.
275.
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between it and competition in R&D to produce future kinds of
products. The Commission stated:
Most suppliers of crop protection products are active in all
sectors, i.e. fungicides, herbicides and insecticides, and have a
correspondingly large R&D potential (R&D intensity: 10%
and over). In suitably quick succession, new products come
onto the market which supersede their predecessors. A
strong market position today is therefore no guarantee at all
of a strong position in the future....

Novartis's turnover in crop protection products worldwide will be roughly twice, and in Europe roughly one and a
half times, that of its nearest competitors. ... Novartis's R&D
capacities will be correspondingly large and the number of
research successes probably high. On account of the synergies in R&D that Ciba and Sandoz will achieve as a result of
the concentration, Novartis will succeed in keeping its research expenditure lower in relative terms than that of its
competitors. If the R&D intensity to date is maintained, the
economies of scale just described will lead to an additional
strengthening of Novartis's R&D potential. The suppliers of
crop protection products are unanimous, however, in thinking that large capacities are no guarantee of the success of
R&D projects. It can therefore only be assumed from the current trend that Novartis will maintain, and possibly even extend, the position as market leader that it has in the crop
protection sector. Moreover, the Commission's investigations
revealed that at least the ... [main] competitors all have the
"critical size" necessary for effective R&D activity.71

There are several points worth noting in Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz.
* The parties tried to rely on the argument that the patents
they had applied for would not be granted in the broad
terms of their applications. The Commission could not
take a position on this;
* The Commission found it necessary to make a detailed assessment of the effects of probable future developments
on competition, although the results were apparently inconclusive;
" Various aspects of the case were considered under "future
markets, " 71 "research and development, "76 and "new
74. Id. at i 170 et seq.
75. Id. at 195 et seq.
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77
products, potential competition;"
* The Commission commented that products for use in stables, for registration of which plant protection authorities
are responsible, takes between six months and three years
depending on the Member State; 78 and
" The Commission required only licenses, not divestiture,
and called for reports on the methoprene situation. 9

3. Other Industries-Some Cases
a. Sarabex Case
°

The Sarabex case concerned membership of the Foreign
Exchange Brokers Association in London ("Association"). U.K.
banks had agreed not to use non-members of the Association for
certain foreign exchange transactions. The Association's members charged an agreed rate of commission. The Commission
required the adoption of objective criteria for membership and
a right of appeal if membership is refused. This was essentially
on the lines now required by the judgment in EBU-Eurovision.81
b. A6rospatiale-Alenia-DeHavilland Merger
Although aircraft production is, of course, a high technology industry, the Commission's decision to prohibit the Arospatiale-Alenia-De Havilland merger 82 concerned turboprop planes
and is based on traditional considerations about high market
shares, elimination of an important competitor, becoming the
only producer of an entire range of aircraft, and barriers to .entry. It is, however, worth mentioning because the Commission
said specifically that the merged companies would have more
flexibility on price than their competitors, and they would have
been able to offer favorable conditions for a particular type of
aircraft when selling several aircraft of different types simultaneously. Selective pricing is not necessarily an abuse, but it may be
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

170 et seq.,
214.
216.
280.

219 et seq.

80. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EIGHTH REPORT ON COMPETITION

POLICY 1978, at 35-36, §§ 35-37 (1979).
81. EBU/Eurovision, 0.J. L 179/23 (1993).
82. Commission Decision No. 91/619/EEC, 0.J. L 334/42 (1991); COMMISSION OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIsT REPORT ON COMPETITION POuCY 1991, at 367-68

(1992).
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important both as evidence and as an advantage of dominance.
The market was the world market, and the efficiency defense was
rejected.
c. Ford-Volkswagen
The Commission's Ford-Volkswagen decision is interesting
not because it involved high technology, but because the Commission was willing to anticipate the future to some extent. The
Commission authorized a joint venture between two of the largest Community producers of private motor vehicles to develop
and produce a multi-purpose vehicle ("MPV"), a minivan.
Though neither parent previously produced an MPV in the European Community, the agreement would probably not have
been authorized if Renault had not already had a dominant or
near-dominant position in the MPV market. When the decision
was adopted, it was not expected that total sales of MPVs in the
European Community would exceed 350,000 by 1995, and so the
joint venture's factory, with an annual production capacity of
190,000, could not have been justified for either parent alone.
There are two notable points about Ford-Volkswagen. First,
the joint venture was authorized because there was an already
dominant producer.8 4 An already dominant company would not
normally be allowed to increase its market power on the basis of
forecast market changes that were said to be likely to reduce its
power in the future, unless the reduction was both certain and
imminent. Second, elaborate and strict conditions were imposed. 85
d. The Mannesmann Cases
Two cases involving Mannesmann show that the Commission is sometimes willing to look into the future and produce
86
conclusions favorable to the companies. In Mannesmann/VDO,
the Commission authorized the acquisition of control of a big
German manufacturer of electronic and electrical control systems for automobiles. The Commission found that Mannes83. Commission Decision No. 93/49/EEC, O.J. L 20/14 (1992) [hereinafter FordVolkswagen]; Matra Hachette v. Commission, CaseT-17/93, [1995] E.C.R. 11-595.
84. Ford/Volkswagen, O.J. L 20/14, at 13 (1992).
85. Id. at art. 2.
86. Commission Case No. IV/M.164, O.J. C 88/13 (1992) [hereinafter Mannesmann/VDO].
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mann, though a large conglomerate, was not a significant potential competitor of VDO because it was no longer likely to be
worthwhile to invest in non-electronic technology and there
were other competitors in the electronic technology. In Mannesmann/Hoesch s7 the Commission relied on the incentives and opportunities for new entrants to go into the market for steel pipes
for petroleum products, in particular as the European Community was harmonizing technical standards and liberalizing public
procurement of these products, among others.
These cases contrast with several cases in the airline industry. In the airline industry cases, the Commission found that an
immediate and undoubted strengthening of dominance would
not be sufficiently offset by the possible future effects of liberalization of air transport and had to be balanced immediately by
specific measures to increase competition."8
e. Crown Cork-CarnaudMetalox
89 the Commission had to
In Crown Cork-CarnaudMetalbox
consider, among other issues, that the merger brought together
"the two market leaders with respect to know-how, R&D, and
technology." 90 The Commission said that although such a
merger might have procompetitive effects due to rationalization,
in this case the effect would be anticompetitive because of the
barriers to entry. Aerosol cans are adapted to customers' needs
and know-how is important. Know-how is a primary factor driving competition and the need for substantial know-how is one of
the barriers to entry. The merger would have been prohibited,
if Crown Cork had not sold several aerosol factories through a
trustee, including state-of-the-art machinery.
87. Commission Decision No. 93/247/EEC, O.J. No L 114/34 (1992) [hereinafter

Mannesmann/Hoesch].
88. Air France-Air Inter, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrIIES, XXTH REPORT ON COMPETITION Poucv 1990, at 90-91, § 116 (1991); Lufthansa-SAS, Commission
Decision No. 96/180/EC O.J. L 54/28 (1996) COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXVmr REPORT ON COMPETImON PoLicy 1995, at 134-35 (1996); Swissair Sabena,
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXVTH REPORT ON COMPETITION Poucv

1995, at 65, § 143 (1996).
89. Commission Decision No. 96/222/EC, OJ. L 75/38 (1995)
Crown Cork]; COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN
TITION Poucy 1995, at 65, 176-77 (1996).

[hereinafter

COMMUNITIES, XXVTH REPORT ON COMPE-

90. Crown Cork, OJ. L 75/38 at 41, § 61 (1995).
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II. SHORT TERM BENEFITS
The Commission is often willing to accept ajoint venture or
other restrictive agreement if it will bring a new competitor or a
new technology quickly onto the market or create a counterweight to an existing dominant enterprise, rather than trying to
force the parent companies to enter the market separately at
some future date. 9 ' This short-term, pragmatic preference for
immediate concrete results rather than less certain, long-term
but potentially greater advantages is normally due to several influences. First, the European Community has had to catch up
with the introduction of some new technologies and has had to
integrate national markets, which usually involves some rationalization. Second, especially in industries in which there were separate companies in many Member States, some joint ventures or
mergers were both necessary and desirable, either to enable a
more efficient competitor to enter a new national market
quickly or to allow a less efficient competitor to continue operations after a merger rather than simply disappearing entirely.
The possibility of withdrawing the exemption for a joint venture
after its immediate value for competition is achieved is not usually an important reason for this short-term approach. The
Commission, as presently staffed, would find it harder than the
U.S. Department of Justice to bring a case based on theoretical
economic arguments that because the parents of a joint venture
could enter the market separately in the future, they should not
be allowed to enter it together now.
In theory, when the timing of benefits and costs to competition differ, they can be discounted appropriately and future benefits may be discounted if it is not certain that they will be realized. The Commission's decisions, however, do not discuss any
efforts to quantify such matters.
The problem of choosing between short-term and longterm benefits sometimes presents itself acutely in those essential
facilities cases in which it is theoretically possible for the plaintiff
to develop its own alternative to the allegedly essential facility,
but the plaintiff says it would take too long, be too unlikely, or
cost too much to be a real and viable alternative. In the shortterm, competition in the downstream market in which the facil91. See Temple Lang, supra note 32, at 244-52.
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ity is needed is promoted by requiring access to be given. In the
long-term, it may be that competition in the provision of the facilities in question might be promoted by forcing the plaintiff to
find some way of developing its own facility. Only in one case
has the Commission used the idea of ordering temporary access
to an essential facility, 92 and, as the case involved interlining between airlines, it probably cannot be used to draw general conclusions. In telecommunications, it is expected that in many
markets there will be a second infrastructure provider, but it is
likely that the duopolists will be jointly dominant and so have
certain duties to provide access.
In most respects, the Commission regards the differences
between cases dealt with under the Merger Regulation and cases
under Regulation 17 as merely procedural. Although on paper
the substantive tests appear different, in practice the Commission treats the test under Article 85(3) (b) as a test of dominance
and tries to ensure that the same or similar results are reached
under both Regulations. There are, however, two important differences, Merger Regulation decisions are permanent while individual exemptions under Article 85(3) are temporary. This
leads, or could lead, to a significant difference in treatment in a
case in which an arrangement with short-term restrictive effects
is permissible only if potential competition is realized in the future. An authorization under Article 85(3) in such circumstances might be justified because it need not be renewed and
could, if necessary, be revoked. An authorization under the
Merger Regulation in such a case, however, could not be justified. This, therefore, is a case, although an unusual one, in
which parties are theoretically likely to have more favorable
treatment under Regulation 17.
Another difference is that under Article 85 there is an explicit efficiency defense. This difference is more apparent than
real because it is available only if the parties are not afforded the
possibility of eliminating competition with respect to a substan92. Commission Decision No. 92/213/EEC, O.J. L 96/34 (1992) [hereinafter Aer
Lingus-British Midland]; Temple Lang, supra note 22, at 458-59, 504-06; see Commission
Decision, Case No. IV/M.235, OJ. C 232/14 (1992) [hereinafter Elf Aquitaine-Minol]
(temporary undertaking to share depots with competitors in the former East Germany).
See generally Joseph P. Griffin & Leeanne T. Sharp, Efficiency Issues in Competition Analysis
in Australia, The European Union, and the United States, 64 A.wnTRUST LJ. 649, 661-72
(1996).
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tial part of the goods or services in question and if the agreement's restrictive features are indispensable to obtain the efficiencies identified. A final difference concerns remedies. A behavioral undertaking is more readily accepted in Regulation 17
cases than in merger cases.
A. Competition in R&D
The practice of the Commission is to consider, when there
is specific evidence about competing lines of R&D, whether a
merger or agreement is likely to restrict substantially competition in R&D. This was done in Upjohn-Pharmacia,93 GlaxoWellcome,94 Crown Cork, 95 Ciba Geigy-Sandoz,9 6 and Shell-Montecatini.97 The Commission's reasons for doing this are essentially
the same as those given by the U.S. FTC:
First, a next generation product might not reach consumers as quickly or with the same quality or diversity as
would be the case absent the transaction. Second, consumers
may be deprived of likely potential price and quality competition in current or future goods markets .... To analyze a
merger's likely competitive effects on current innovation
competition itself, however, one must ask whether a proposed
merger would likely change the merged firm's abilities or incentives 98to engage in [this] innovation competition post
merger.
The FTC went on to say that innovation market analysis should
be used only where the innovation is directed towards a particular good and where the innovation can be associated with specialized assets or characteristics of specific firms. The Commission would be more likely to say that competition in R&D is important only where the competition between the firms in
question is the leading research in the field, is directed specifi93. Commission Decision, Case No. IV/M.631, OJ. C 294/9 (1995).
94. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXVTH REPORT ON COMPETITION

Poucy 1995, at 153-64 (1996).
95. Crown Cork, O.J. L 75/38 (1995).
96. Commission Decision (Eur. Comm'n July 17, 1996) [hereinafter Ciba GeigySandoz] (not yet reported).
97. Shell-Montecatini, OJ. L 332/48 (1994).
98. Executive Summary and Principal Conclusions, in ANTICIPATING THE 21s-r CENTURY, supra note 3, ch. 1, at 4-5 (emphasis added). See Thomas N. Dahdouh &
Mongoven, The Shape of Things to Come: Innovation Market Analysis in Merger Cases, 64
ANTITRUST LJ. 405-41 (1996).
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cally towards producing or improving the same product or process, and is associated with specialized R&D programs of those
firms. The FTC principle is broader perhaps, but not significantly different in most situations. The Commission does not
seem to consider it necessary to have as many as five or more
independent substitutable R&D programs after the merger or
agreement, as the FTC does. A similar competition problem
could arise if a company with a successful product already on the
market merges with a company with an active R&D program to
produce a new product competing with the first one.
In the case of joint ventures, the Commission is already accustomed to the argument that parent companies acting rationally in their own separate interests have an incentive to align
their prices with those of their joint venture selling in the same
product and geographical market to avoid reducing the value of
their own investment.99 It is, therefore, natural for the Commission when appropriate to accept the argument that if a merger
or agreement creates an incentive not to invest in R&D that
would be likely to reduce the value of the companies' existing
products or another line of R&D, the existence of this incentive
will have anticompetitive effects that should be taken into account.
The Commission has not defined an "innovation market"1°°
and has arrived at much the same result by using the more traditional concept of competition by two companies in R&D directed towards the same goal. The Commission also seems more
likely to use this approach than a potential competition approach, implicitly considering the R&D approach more convincing, practical, and immediate. In the European Community,
however, there has been much less theoretical discussion about
these questions. The Commission has often accepted improved
R&D as a benefit of cooperation or merger in individual cases,
when appropriate. It would, therefore, be inconsistent and un99. Temple Lang, supra note 32, at 228-29.
100. The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property define an innovation market as the "research and development directed to particular new or improved goods or processes,
and the close substitutes for that research and development." DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE
AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ANTIRuST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTEL,
LECTUAL PROPERTY (1995), reprinted in 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 13,132, 20,733, 20,738

(Apr. 6, 1995).
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sustainable to say that a merger or agreement could never have
an anticompetitive effect on R&D. In the European Community, the real issue is not whether to do this in appropriate cases,
but how to do it. The cases in which the Commission has acted
against mergers likely to reduce R&D, or the incentives for R&D,
have been fairly clear ones.
In passing, one difference between the European Community and the United States should be noted. In the European
Community, the approval processes (until 1995 there was no
Community equivalent of the Food and Drugs Administration
and even now only biotechnology products must be submitted to
the European Agency for Evaluation of Medicinal Products) for
pharmaceutical and biotechnology products do not take as long
as those in the United States. Subsequently, it would not take as
long as in the United States for a substitutable product to come
on the market as a result of the R&D of a third company, if there
were one.
The FTC Report correctly points out' 0 that a feature of situations in which a merger or agreement today is thought likely to
reduce R&D soon and produce anticompetitive effects on the
market later is the lapse of time between the anticompetitive
conduct and its effects and that these effects will be delays or
"non-events," not "events". This clearly goes back to the basic
problem that it is always difficult to foresee the future, particularly so in rapidly changing, high-technology industries.
The Commission's reliance on forecasts of future market
conditions may, in theory, either improve or harm the antitrust
position of the parties. In the two Mannesmann cases 10 2 and in
Ford/Volkswagen, °3 the Commission relied on probable future
developments not resulting from current R&D and arrived at
conclusions favorable to the parties. In Glaxo-Wellcome T' Crown
Cork,10 5 Shell-Montecatini,106 and Ciba Geigy-Sandoz,' °7 however,
the Commission drew conclusions unfavorable to the parties and
101. ANTICIPATING THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 3, ch. 7, at 14.

102. Mannesmann/Hoesch, OJ. L 114/34 (1992); Mannesman/VDO, Oj. C 88/
13 (1992).
103. Ford/Volkswagen, Oj. L 20/14 (1992).
104. Glaxo-Wellcome, OJ. C 65/4 (1995).
105. Commission Decision No. 96/222/EC, O.J. L 75/39 (1995).
106. Commission Decision No. 94/811/EC, O.J. L 332/49 (1994).
107. Ciba Geigy-Sandoz (Commission Decision, Eur. Comm'n July 17, 1996) (not
yet reported).
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in each case allowed the merger only on the basis of commitments to make divestments. In practice, therefore, taking competition in R&D into account seems likely to lead to extra difficulties for mergers, because it is unlikely that the Commission
would be willing to rely completely on the argument that a nondominant third company's R&D, about which by definition the
parties are not well informed, was so certain to be more successful than the combined R&D of the parties that the merger could
go ahead.
B. Speed of Technological Change and R&D
The next question is whether, by looking at R&D today, one
can be sure how far competition will be lessened, or which companies will have market power at the time when the resulting
products are on the market. The connection between R&D and
competition and between R&D and innovation is no clearer in
the European Community than it is in North America. Several
situations may arise. First, the two companies involved, or one of
them, may be about to abandon R&D in the area in question, or
both may be working on similar approaches to the same problem. In such a case, there is no objection to the agreement on
R&D grounds. Second, the two companies are working on different approaches to a crucial problem that, when solved, will
give the successful company a big advantage. In such a situation,
it might be important to ensure that both lines of research continued. In this situation, divestiture of the research, if it could
be done satisfactorily by a license of the accumulated know-how
or otherwise, would be a necessary condition for approval. This
was the Glaxo-Welcome, Shell-Montecatini, and Crown Cork situa08
tion.
Because economic analysis does not say much that is precise
about the relationship between the level of R&D and competition or about the relationship between R&D and innovation, a
case-by-case or at least industry-by-industry approach seems inevitable. Furthermore, precise "non-static" competition analysis,
however attractive in theory, seems difficult in practice.
At first sight, the speed of technological change and the resulting need for R&D could have two different effects. On one
hand, it might mean that collusion is more difficult and domi108. See supra notes 68, 64, 88 and accompanying text.
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nance will more quickly erode than in other industries. On the
other hand, it might mean that the need for large R&D expenditure is an extra barrier to entry that will protect existing dominance because of the need to build on existing R&D.
It seems necessary to distinguish between industries in
which technological developments occur with relatively little
R&D because the innovation requires small resources or little
learning or experience and industries in which technological developments usually involve large R&D expenditure by the principal companies. The conclusion suggested is that antitrust policy
should be more concerned about the latter.
It is, of course, true that even in high-technology industries
some important technological developments can be made with
little R&D, and, therefore, the distinction is not a clearcut one.
It may, therefore, be useful to distinguish also between industries in which large expenditures on R&D is almost certain to
produce substantial results provided that those involved are
clever enough, like software, and industries in which it is possible sometimes to spend large sums of money without any useful
results at all, such as pharmaceutical research and biotechnology. For antitrust practitioners, there is clearly no alternative to
knowing the facts of the particular industry and the technology
concerned.
The cases raise several essential issues. First, how certain is
it that any particular technological change will occur? A generalized certainty that some important changes will occur has no
operational significance. Second, how quickly will the identified
changes occur? It is only after these questions have been answered that a more general question arises: in an industry undergoing rapid technological change, in which R&D is important, is it possible to forecast the future with sufficient confidence for the forecast to be the principal basis for antitrust
action, using assessments of current R&D expenditure? In other
words, can probable future competition be so well measured by
current R&D spending that it is a better test for the future than
current market power?
It is useful to clear away one point. If there is a "market for
R&D," it is only if companies are selling the service of providing
R&D to other companies. That is a present market for a present
service, and it is not the same as the question of whether R&D
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activities for the researcher's own use is a good measure of future market power.
C. Future Market Power and R&D
Some comments are needed regarding the idea that future
market power might be better measured by looking at R&D expenditure than at present market shares:
" In EC antitrust law, market shares are not the only criteria
of dominance. Other advantages and disadvantages must
be taken into account if they evidence or affect market
power. So it is normal and necessary to take into account
technological expertise, large R&D spending, a large volume of patents or know-how, and so on;
* R&D spending is not necessarily a good measure of future
market power. Not all such spending yields results, and
the value of results is not necessarily proportionate to
spending. In particular in the biotechnology industry, a
discovery made today may not be commercially available
for several years;
* To use R&D as a measure of future market power, one
would need to value the company's existing know-how,
perhaps based on past R&D spending, and the probability
of success of its current R&D spending. This would be impossibly difficult in most cases, unless an undeniable technological breakthrough had just occurred, and not necessarily even then might it be possible;
* Even a company with little R&D spending of its own may
be a licensee of a brilliant inventor, a company with a successful R&D program, or a great university. Such links
might prove to be more significant than the company's
own R&D. In particular in biotechnology, much R&D is
carried out by small firms that license successful inventions or discoveries to big companies with the production
capacity to commercialize it;
" A deep pocket to buy a new invention, or an infrastructure
ready to exploit it, might be more important than R&D
itself;
" Assessments of the value of R&D programs would be liable
to change more radically, in the light of future technology, than other assessments of market power. Antitrust
analysis should not be more mercurial than the situation
requires;
" In the European Community, with its still partly separate
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national markets, future market power in high-tech markets seems likely to be more influenced by existing advantages and by shrewd future alliances and strategies leading
to expansion into the rest of Europe, than by wholly new
discoveries or even improved production methods,
although nobody can foresee the future clearly in biotechnology; and
The margin of error in assessing the future market power
of one company by reference to its R&D is already large.
If one tried to compare the future market power of several
companies, relative to one another, primarily in this way,
the margin of error would become excessive.
Another aspect of all this is that a competition authority
dealing with a case in which two or more companies have competing R&D lines must ultimately decide whether the merger or
agreement will reduce duplication and increase the chances of
success or eliminate competition between promising lines of inquiry. This often difficult decision is unaffected by the amounts
of money being spent by either company. So is the even more
difficult question: which line of research is most likely to succeed?
D. Buyers Choosing the ProductMost Likely to Be Enhanced
Buyers of sophisticated hardware and other products often
choose the product which they believe is most likely to be improved or enhanced during its lifetime in their hands. In other
words, the buyers are choosing not only the product, but also
what they believe, rightly or wrongly, is the supplier most likely
to provide them with desirable improvements when they become
available.
" Buyers might base their views on which supplier is most
likely to provide enhancements on the R&D spending of
the competing suppliers. But, they are just as likely to
base their views on the suppliers' track records in providing enhancements or on contractual commitments to provide all enhancements when they become available.
" A buyer of sophisticated hardware would be less likely to
buy the product of a supplier thought likely to replace its
existing product with an entirely new product, instead of
providing enhancements.
" Total R&D spending would not be a good measure of a
given company's chances of providing enhancements. To
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produce a more indicative answer, one would need to
know if the R&D was on enhancements or an entirely new
product.

E. Caution Is Needed in Antitrust in Innovative Industries
Apart from the difficulty of foreseeing the future, caution is
essential for another reason when dealing with innovation markets. There are three identifiable strands of opinion about innovation markets. In brief, one view is that in defining the present
generation of markets for products or services, it is sufficient to
take into account present R&D and other innovation-producing
activities that are foreseeably likely to lead to the next generation of products. A second view is that what is important is the
next generation of products or services, and that antitrust decisions today should be based on the probable effects of today's
agreements, mergers, or practices in the next-generation market, assessed by reference to R&D spending and expertise. A
third view focuses on competition in R&D itself, and states that
the main question to be asked is whether today's agreements,
mergers, or practices allow the companies involved to slow down
competition in a whole area of innovation or R&D.
The second view, and even more the third view, risks making today's high R&D spending or demonstrated innovative skills
into a disadvantage in antitrust assessment. It would be a disadvantage that would operate today before the supposed results of
today's R&D had been realized. This would mean, if the result
was to influence today's antitrust decisions at all, that a high
level of R&D today would lead to less favorable treatment for the
company involved.
It is, of course, elementary in Community competition law
as in U.S. antitrust law that a large or successful R&D program
may, among other elements, be evidence of current dominance.
In this limited sense, such a program is an antitrust disadvantage. The second and third views, however, would attribute
greater importance to R&D, and the third would make it the key
issue. The effect might be irrational because it would penalize
an activity that is not only inherently desirable but crucially necessary in the sectors in question.
Caution is even more necessary in biotechnology than in,
for example, software. Expenditure on software development by
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good programers is sure to produce useful results, even if nobody can be sure in advance that one company's future software
will necessarily be better than another's. But in biotechnology,
even using combinatorial chemistry, it is not always possible to
be certain that a particular line of research will necessarily produce the desired results in the relevant future or at all, still less
to judge in advance which of two lines of research will produce
profitable results first.
Caution, of course, also leads to the conclusion that a
merger, a joint venture, or an agreement on joint research that
causes significant and financially viable independent research to
come to an end today or to cease to be independently carried
out is anticompetitive to that extent. Yet another reason for
doubting the theory that antitrust policy should be based primarily on R&D considerations is the emerging evidence that it is not
pioneers but "early leaders," those who enter new markets after
the pioneers, which do best in new markets. 10 Because it is pioneers and not early leaders who seem most likely to spend R&D
money on entirely new markets, it would be unwise to base forecasts of future markets on pioneers' R&D.
In fact, there are broader reasons for caution in relying on
forecasts about the future. There are, for example, two beliefs
about the future of multimedia. One view holds that the future
will be dominated by a few vertically and horizontally integrated
companies. The other view predicts that the Internet or some
similar arrangements will provide low entry barriers, specialization, many and diverse companies, and a fluid market. These
are fundamentally different visions, and it would be unwise for
an antitrust authority to count on one rather than the other being correct. The most that antitrust can do is to ensure that
present market power is not used to prevent whatever new developments the market may produce. In the telecommunications
sector, the economics of different services are leading to segmentation of previously unified areas; basic voice networks are
run by infrastructure providers, and value-added data networks
are user-driven.
109. GerardJ. Tellis & Peter N. Golder, First to Market, First to Fail? Real Causes of
EnduringMark Leadership, 37 SLOANE MrGrr. REV. Winter 65 (1996); see Whyfirst may not
/ast,ECONOMIST, Mar. 16, 1996, at 65; FREDERICK E. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL
MARET STRUCrURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 635-37 (3d ed. 1990).
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F. Conclusion-Looking into the Future

One cannot easily imagine the Commission saying, "It]he
parties to this merger are not collectively dominant today, but
they are doing research that is certain to be so much more successful than anyone else's that they will certainly be dominant in
the future, and so we prohibit the merger." Yet, that is the crucial test. It would not be impossible to say that, but the circumstances would be unusual and extreme. The conclusion to be
drawn from the Commission's decisions is that it is cautious and
reluctant to try to look too far into the future. In particular, it is
more willing to allow anticompetitive arrangements today between non-dominant companies than to allow increases in dominant power in the hope that competition will re-emerge in the
future. Generalizations are difficult, however, because each case
depends so much on the facts as they are seen by the Commission at the time when it made its decision. This is, of course,
especially important under the Merger Regulation because such
decisions are permanent and not reviewable by the Commission.
Certainly, the Commission looks at competition in technology
and R&D when it thinks it appropriate to do so, but perhaps
with less willingness to look into the future than the U.S. Department of Justice or FTC, even making allowances for differences
in circumstances in the European Community.
G. Timing Issues and Dominant Companies' Efforts to Counteract the
Effects of Liberalization
When dominant companies in regulated industries know
that liberalization is imminent, they need to adapt. Sometimes,
they seek to adapt by taking steps to restrict the competition that
is emerging. For example, ex-monopolies try to make exclusive
agreements with their customers. It is particularly important to
ensure that the emergence of real competition is not prevented
in this way. So arrangements that might in other circumstances
be permissible are not legal if they are made at a time when they
offset the foreseeable benefits of liberalization, and prompt antitrust action may be needed to prevent this offsetting from occurring.
H. Changes in Market Boundaries and Degrees of Substitutability
Technological change or liberalization of regulatory re-
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gimes may erode dominant positions and facilitate entry of new
competitors into a market. Technological change may also
erode or eliminate the boundaries between markets by ending
the differences between products or services that were previously
distinct and making them increasingly substitutable for one another. There are several examples. A few years ago, computers
came with "main memory""' and "add-on memory.""' Presently, the memory capacity of even small computers is greater
than that of main frame computers from not long ago. If extra
memory is needed many users, especially private users, buy
larger computers, not add-on memory. In the TV industry, encryption and decoders have made it possible to have pay-TV
transmitted via satellite as well as by cable although cable or telephone lines in general are still needed for interactive services.
The enormous increases in capacity due to optical fibers and
digitalization in place of analog signals have made it possible for
electricity and railway companies, to enter the telecommunications sector.
Such changes create legal difficulties because they make the
future hard to foresee, and, in particular, because it is often hard
to say when a change will alter a given market even if it is clear
that it will ultimately do so. Antitrust authorities may have to

decide questions like whether to permit a merger that will create
a dominant position today, merely on the grounds that in the
foreseeable future technological change is likely to erode or end
that dominance. Similar issues arise where it is said that dominance will end or greater economies of scale are needed because
12
of future liberalization."
Antitrust authorities cannot normally foresee the economic
future with confidence, and the Commission does not authorize
what would otherwise be unlawful unless it is sure that it can
foresee the future clearly enough. It is slow to allow a merger
that is unquestionably anticompetitive today on the basis that it
will prove in the future to have procompetitive effects or to have
been compensated for by probable procompetitive influences on
the market that have not yet come into existence. On the other
110. Main memory is the standard memory installed in a computer. See Paul M.
Eng, How to Pick the PC that's Compatible with You, Bus. WK., Nov. 28, 1994, at 96.
111. The consumer can install add-on memory to the computer after purchase.
See id. (discussing add-on memory).
112. Temple Lang, supra note 51, at 343-45.
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hand, if a future situation is certain enough and coming soon
enough, there is no reason why it cannot act on it, for example,
Mannesmann/Hoesch i But it must always be kept in mind that a
merger today may discourage future market entry or that a
merger today may prevent one of the merging companies from
becoming the nucleus of a new effective competitor for the
other.
I. Changes in Market Boundaries and Essential Facilities
In most essential facility cases, there is no doubt that there
are two separate markets involved, either because the owner of
an essential facility has already given access to some unrelated
company or because other companies in similar situations frequently do so. The question as to whether these markets are
separate is an objective one, and the owner of a facility cannot
avoid the application of the principle merely by saying that it has
always regarded all of its activities as an integrated, unified operation.
Difficulties can arise, however, in some cases because of
changes in market boundaries. Two examples may be helpful:
" A software company writes the operating programs for a
popular type of personal computer. It also writes applications programs, and, in this respect, it has competition. If
it includes one or more applications programs into its basic operating program, it alters the interface between its
operating program and its competitor's programs and
makes it difficult for them to sell their applications programs for use with its operating program; and
" A chemical, pharmaceutical, or biotechnology company
has produced raw material that it uses in its own downstream operation and also sells to a downstream competitor making the same end product, the Commercial Solvents
situation. 1 4 It then discovers a more efficient method of
synthesizing the end product without making the raw material.
Both of these hypothetical examples raise the question of
whether a dominant company that supplies, and is required by

law to supply, a service to its competitors in a downstream or
113. Mannesmann/Hoesch, O.J. L 114/34 (1992).

114. Commercial Solvents, [1974] E.C.R. at 223, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R. at 309.
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otherwise related market is free to alter the nature of the service
that it provides to competitors in that market, in effect changing
the boundaries of that market for reasons of technology or other
efficiency. The answer seems to be that it is free to do this as
long as it does so objectively to improve its own product or service and not primarily with the effect of making difficulties for its
downstream competitors. A dominant company is not required
to continue providing an obsolete product or service to its downstream competitors, and a dominant company is free to make
appropriate changes in the nature of the product or service that
it supplies to its competitors. The proportionality principle,"'5
however, means that a dominant company is not free to cause
substantial inconvenience to its competitors to achieve a minimal improvement in its service. A dominant company is not free
to cut off supplies to a downstream competitor merely because,
without altering the nature of the product it produces at the
stage at which it has sold it, the dominant company chooses to
integrate forward and extend its own activities.
If the producer of an operating system extends the functionality of an operating system to include functions for which
users previously had to buy a separate applications program,
probably with a choice between several competing applications
programs, the issue of whether this constitutes technological integration or bundling may arise. Although competition law
should not be used to slow technological progress, there may be
situations where adding functions to an operating system represents an exclusionary abuse rather than technical progress. Adding a function to an operating system that makes it easier to use
or more functional for all users is probably technical progress
even if users could previously achieve a similar level of ease of
115. The principle of proportionality is a general principle of Community law
which is primarily a prohibition on governmental action imposing loss or hardship
which is unnecessary or out of proportion to the objective sought. See NICHOLAS
EMIUOU, THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN EUROPEAN LAw: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
2-3 (1996). The principle also constrains the behavior of dominant companies and
requires them, even when legitimately defending or promoting their interests, not to
overreact and unnecessarily harm other companies. See United Brands v. Commission,
Case 27/76, [1978] E.C.R. 207, 1 189-94 (holding that participation by distributor in a
competitor's sales campaign is not justification for dominant company cutting off supply). It seems to follow that a dominant company which legitimately improves its own
product or production methods may have a duty to minimize the adverse consequences
to dependent downstream users.
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use or functionality by buying add on products. Adding a piece
of specialized software to the operating system and forcing all
users to pay for it, however, only represents technical progress
for some users and raises issues of cross-subsidization and of exclusionary intent. Again, the proportionality principle is relevant.
A similar issue arises if improvements in the dominant company's software are made primarily for its own benefit, without
significantly altering its service to its customers. These changes
affect the place of attachment to the computer network or operating system. This is particularly important if functionality is affected. In such a situation, a dominant company may have a
duty under the proportionality principle to minimize the inconvenience caused to downstream competitors needing access and
its downstream competitors,
to disclose the interface changes to
116
case.
IBM
as in the Commission's
In short, the boundaries between the upstream and downstream markets, or between the modules in a horizontally integrated industry, are not necessarily fixed and permanent. The
dominant company, because it should be free to improve its
product, is also free to alter the interfaces between modules or
to modify the point "downstream" at which a plaintiff needs to
have access but may be obliged to take remedial action. Another
similar question is when a dominant company has a duty to give
advance notice to downstream competitors of its intention to
change 8its interface. This was raised in the IBM case 1 7 and in
11

Decca.

Another distinct question is whether change in the boundaries of the markets may alter the duty of a dominant owner of an
intellectual property right to license it to avoid monopolization
of the complementary market. If, for example, interactive TV
became so widespread that viewers could call up next week's programs on their screens and did not need a weekly TV magazine,
would that end the duty of the BBC to give programs in advance
to the Magill magazine because the markets were no longer sep116. International Business Machines Corp. v. Commission, Case 60/81, [1981]
E.C.R. 2639, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. 635.
117. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FOURTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION PoucY 1984, at 77-79, §§ 94-95 (1985).
118. Commission Decision No. 89/113/EEC, O.J. L 43/27 (1989) [hereinafter
Decca].
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arate? It seems not, because the TV magazine market would still
be distinct from the market for TV programs, even if the demand for TV magazines was reduced substantially. But it is possible to imagine situations in which intellectual property rights applying to both operating software and applications programs
might no longer have to be licensed because the markets for
both products had merged.
J. Changes in the Market and the Tests to Be Applied by the
Community Courts
In any rapidly changing market, procedural problems may
arise. A Commission decision in a competition case must be
challenged under Article 173 of the EC Treaty within two
months before the Court of First Instance. The oral hearing
before the Court of First Instance is often not until twelve to
twenty-four months after the date of the Commission's decision,
and the judgment of the Court ofJustice, if the case is appealed
on points of law, may be rendered a year or so after that.
One problem that results from this is obvious, the legal situation will not be known with certainty for several years. Another
problem is less obvious; there may be factual evidence that could
be put before the Court of First Instance or of which the Court
of Justice may be made aware that was not available at the time
that the Commission made its decision. Should this evidence,
whether it confirms or refutes the Commission's conclusions, be
admissible? This question is linked to another; is it permissible
for a company to make an argument for the first time before the
Court of First Instance that it could have made, but did not
make, before the Commission? This second question is not specific to high-technology industries and is not discussed here, but
the first question needs analysis in relation to rapidly changing
markets.
At first sight, most people would say that all available evidence should be before the Court of First Instance, irrespective
of when it came into existence. It would be artificial and unrealistic to expect the Court of First Instance to close its eyes to what
might be important evidence. If the Court of First Instance was
obliged to ignore such evidence, its judgment might be substantially wrong in the light of facts known at the time it was rendered. If the Court of First Instance should ignore such evi-
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dence, there would be an onus on the Commission to revise its
decision in the light of the changed circumstances. If the Commission's decision was not sufficiently proved by evidence available at the time it was rendered but was fully proved by evidence
that became available later, few useful results might be obtained
by annulling it, obliging the Commission to conduct a new procedure and adopt a new, more soundly based decision. If the
Commission's decision seemed fully justified by the facts known
at the time but later turns out to be unjustified, it should be
either annulled by the Court of First Instance, with retroactive
effect, or canceled by the Commission, which could be done
only with prospective effects, if that was appropriate.
This apparently common-sense view is not necessarily correct, and it is not easy to reconcile with some well established
rules of law. The validity of any decision of the Commission
must be assessed as of the date on which it is adopted. More
importantly, the reasons set forth in the decision must be sufficient to justify it. If the reasons are not sufficient, the fact that
better reasons were available at the time or came into existence
later will not cure the decision. An applicant who challenges a
Commission decision in the Court of First Instance may or may
not be free to make new arguments that it could have made to
the Commission, but such an applicant is not free to make, in
later written or oral arguments, points that it did not make in its
initial application to the Court of First Instance. It certainly
would seem odd and anomalous if a Commission decision that
seemed fully justified at the time could be annulled retroactively
because of facts that did not exist at the time when it was rendered.
Perhaps no simple rule covering all cases is appropriate or
possible. Probably a distinction should be drawn between new
evidence on arguments already raised and wholly new arguments, the latter being harder to justify. A distinction certainly
must be drawn between interim measure decisions of the Commission, which have to be based on a primafacie case, and which
will, therefore, be valid even if the Commission itself later
changes its views, and definitive decisions.
K. Complex Settlements
In high technology industries, as in other industries, there
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has been a tendency, especially in larger cases, for companies to
negotiate with the Commission, modify their plans, and, in most
but not all cases, ultimately get approval. This goes some way in
the same direction as a trend that has been commented on in
the United States.' 19 In the European Community, this tendency exists for several reasons. First, some joint venture and
merger cases are so large and complex that the parties can always find something that is worth divesting or licensing without
destroying the value of the whole transaction. Second, in cases
involving companies in industries being liberalized, Member
States can facilitate deals that they want to encourage, usually
but not necessarily involving state-owned corporations, by accelerating liberalization to offset the anticompetitive effects of
whatever restructuring is planned." ° The third reason is an increasing tendency for companies to offer undertakings that, if
accepted, may be incorporated in Commission decisions as conditions or may be accepted, in some cases, as sufficient without
being replaced by requirements in a formal decision. It will be
seen that these three reasons overlap. An example of another
specific type of case is the Italian GSM Operators decision 121 in
which the Commission ruled that Italy had infringed Article 90
of the EC Treaty by imposing on the second Italian mobile
phone company a large payment for its license that had not
been required for the first mobile phone company's licensee.
The Commission gave the Italian authorities the choice between
repayment or requiring a corresponding payment from the first
licensee, which were the simplest ways of ending the distortion
of competition, and "corrective measures" equivalent in economic terms to the payment imposed on the second operator.
The "corrective measures" led the Italian authorities to negotiate
a package of measures with the Commission. Similar situations
have arisen in several other Member States.
Several comments are appropriate:
119. See Consent Decrees: Antitrust Enforcers as Regulators?, 10 ANTITRUST No. 1 (Fall
1995).
120. See Temple Lang, supra note 51, at 368-69. This was done in the Atlas-PhoenixGlobal One decision in 1996; see also Air France/Sabena, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES, XXIID REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1992, at 151-53, § 259 (1992).
121. Commission Decision No. 95/489/EC, O.J. No L 280/49, (1995); COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXVTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1995, at
54, § 109 (1996) (on appeal to Community courts).
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" The fact that a settlement of an antitrust case is complicated in itself proves nothing about whether a party conceded too much, or whether the Commission was trying to
achieve objectives other than those properly required by
pure Community antitrust law considerations. Complex
detailed settlements can be precisely adapted to the needs
of the situation;
" In most cases, the specific proposals for divestiture, liberalization, or other modifications come from the parties or
the government involved, not from the Commission;
" As far as I know, all the undertakings, conditions, and obligations resulting from negotiations and modifications in
such cases have been designed and intended to promote
competition, either by offsetting the anticompetitive effects of the transaction or by accelerating liberalization of
the national market. I know of no case where the Commission has accepted or required a modification for motives other than competition; and
" The Commission is increasingly reluctant to accept undertakings or to impose conditions or obligations that require
or prohibit particular behavior, because they are troublesome to supervise and likely to be controversial and not
effective. The Commission has, however, imposed or accepted, in both Articles 85 and 86 cases, non-discrimination duties that are, of course, behavioral and that may
require some degree of supervision, though in some cases
the Commission has proposed arbitration as a means of
1 22
dealing with day-to-day disputes.
L. Article 85 and Agreements to Set Up Standards
Under the International Standards Organization's definition, a standard is "a document established by consensus and approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and
repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities or
their results, aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree
of order in a given context."123 The FTC Report uses a narrower
concept: "standards... establish a common mode of interaction
...
which enables users to understand each others communica122. Commission Decision No. 89/467/EEC, OJ. L 226/25 (1989) (hereinafter
UXP].
123. International Standards Organizations, Standardization and Related ActivaisGeneral Vocabulay, (visited Feb. 1, 1997) <http://www.iso.ch/cate/24887.html.
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tion." 124 Standards and networks are particularly important in
the computer industry, in telecommunications, and in sound
and video recording technology.
In practice, Community standards have been "approved" by,
among other bodies, CEN, CENELEC, and ETSI. ETSI, however, works slowly, and in high-technology industries it is natural
that dynamic companies should try to develop standards first
and have them approved by ETSI later. This is often necessary if
the proposed standard needs to be widely used before it can be
satisfactorily approved.
An agreement between two or more companies to develop a
standard does not necessarily restrict competition. The question
of whether it does has to be looked at in light of the effects of
the agreement on competition between the parties and its possible exclusionary effects on companies that are not parties to the
agreement.
If two companies that are not actual or potential competitors agree to work together to develop a standard, there is no
effect on competition. This occurs, for example, when the companies involved produce different products that need to work
together.
In practice, the parties to agreements to develop standards
usually include companies that are competitors of one another.
Whether the agreement restricts competition between them usually depends on whether the standard to be developed is an important element in the competition between them. Usually it is
not, and, even when it is, the advantages for competition that
would result if the competitors could agree on a single standard
may outweigh the anticompetitive effects of the agreement.
Much may depend on whether the competing companies have
already developed products on the basis of different specifications or characteristics, and if so, what effects the agreement will
have on competition between those products. Although at some
stages in the development of a particular product or service a
proposed standard can be an important element in competitive
124. ANTICIPATING THE 21sr CENTURY, supra note 3, ch. 9, at 1. The European
Commission's IBM case essentially involved standards from the viewpoint of competing
producers of hardware and software rather than users. IBM v. Commission, Case 60/
81, [1981] E.C.R. 2639; COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FOURTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1984, at 77-79, §§ 94-95 (1985); Temple Lang, supra note

22, at 455-57.
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differentiation and there may be intense competition to persuade ETSI or any other body to choose between two or more
competing standards, in the end it usually becomes more advantageous for everyone to have a single standard. This is particularly so in the European Community where competition is likely
to increase the more national markets are integrated.
Another issue that is important in considering the effect of
an agreement on competition between parties is whether the
parties need to cooperate reciprocally with one another to provide a satisfactory service to their customers and, therefore, need
to establish a technical basis for this cooperation. The main telecommunications companies in different countries have to be
able to transmit messages between their networks and must have
some technical basis for connecting them. It is necessary, and
not anticompetitive, to make the most efficient arrangement
available.
An agreement to develop a standard, however, may often
lead to, or be linked with, arrangements to cooperate in other
respects that may restrict competition. In practice, whether an
agreement to develop a standard is anticompetitive depends
largely on whether new parties may freely join the agreement
and take part in the development on non-discriminatory terms
(for example, without unjustifiably giving them less influence
than the founding members) and on whether the standard when
developed will be available to all companies on equal terms. 12
In practice, only companies with market power set out to develop standards. Membership of standard-developing groups
should be open at all times to all companies likely to be interested in or affected by the result.
The parties to an agreement, however, should not develop a
standard which would create a barrier to entry for other companies, even if it is to be formally available to everyone. So, for
example, a group of telecom network operators should not develop a basic standard for basic networks if the effect of the standard would be to raise the barriers for entry into the market for
the provision of basic networks. In the case of enhanced or ad125. Cf., Eurovisio, [1996] 5 C.M.L.R. at 386; see Vollmer, Product and Technical
StandardizationUnder Article 85, 1986 E.C.L.R. 388-402; see Commission Communication,
359 (1996) (on Standardization and the Global Information Society: The European
Approach).
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ded value services, however, the natural barriers to entry are
lower, and it is less likely that a standard fixed for such areas
would significantly raise these natural barriers. But, any standard, the effect of which is to create or to raise barriers to entry
into the market, needs to be justified under Article 85 (3) of the
12 6
EC Treaty.
It is important to remember that when a standard has been
approved by a Community standards organization it can become
compulsory and is not merely a preferred or recognized standard. A Community standard may be merely permissive, i.e., everyone must accept goods or services that comply with it, or exclusive, everyone must use it and no other standard. The effect of
the standard on barriers to entry into any market may depend,
among other things, on what kind of standard it is in this respect.
In theory, the fact that a standard has been approved by
ETSI or any other Community standards body does not make it
automatically immune from challenge under Community competition rules. Member States may not authorize or approve
agreements between companies the effects of which are contrary
to Article 85, and what they may not do individually, they may
not do collectively either.
The Article 85 standards cases that have arisen in Community law so far, for example, IGR Stereo-Salora,12 7 have not raised
important questions about the relative merits of intrasystem and
intersystem competition, because in each case it was clear that
no second system was feasible. The Commission is well aware
that this often difficult question arises in standards cases, as it
does in essential facilities cases.
M. Standards and Intellectual Property
A standard may include information protected by intellectual property rights and, if so, the owner of the intellectual property rights continues to be entitled to remuneration for their
use. If the rights are freely licensed, or if non-parties are freely
admitted to any patent pool associated with the standard (if ap126. See Commission Decision No. 95/551/EC, O.J. L 312/79 (1995) [hereinafter
Dutch Crane Hire].
127. 1GR, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, ELEvEmNH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1981, at 63-64, § 94 (1982).
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propriate, on payment of a suitable contribution to the capital
costs involved), there will normally be no difficulty as a result of
the fact that intellectual property rights are involved.
If the effect of the agreement on a standard is to create a
barrier to entry or a competitive handicap for non-parties and
the parties to the agreement or the owner of the intellectual
property rights refuse to license the rights or are willing to do so
only on discriminatory terms, Article 85 of the EC Treaty may
create a duty to license on non-discriminatory terms, regardless
of whether Article 86 is applicable. 12 The leading cases under
Article 85 involving intellectual property rights are IGR-Stereo Television 2 9 and RTE-BB-ITV-Magill. I30
It is generally accepted that it is harder tojustify a refusal to
license intellectual property rights when Article 85 of the EC
Treaty applies than when Article 86 applies. In any case, after a
standard has been adopted, it must be open to everyone. Before
the standard is finally adopted, therefore, a refusal to license
would be justified, for example, if the licensee refused to pay its
share of development costs on a non-discriminatory basis or was
not creditworthy. It seems reasonable to say that the burden of
proof is on the parties to any agreement intended to lead to a
standard to show that any refusal to license intellectual property
rights is justified. This is not because a refusal is necessarily unjustified. Rather, it is because, in those circumstances, the parties concerned must have an identifiable reason for the refusal
and should be able to articulate the reasons. Parties to an agreement to promote a standard for general use should have no difficulty in stating why they decline to license intellectual property
rights needed by users of the standard.
N. Multicompany Arrangements,Joint Ventures, and the Essential
FacilitiesPrinciple
A principle similar to the essential facilities principle and
raising similar economic issues, applies when two or more companies make arrangements to establish joint or reciprocal opera128. Temple Lang, supra note 22, at 507-09; Commission Regulation No. 3652/93,

o.J. L 333/37 (1993).
129. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EuW~NTH REPORT ON COMPETIPOLICY 1981, at 6364 (1982).
130. RTE, [1991] E.C.R. at II-485, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 586; 17P, [1991] E.C.R. at
IH-575, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 745; BBC, [1991] E.C.R. at HI-535, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 669.
TION
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tions. This only applies, however, if third parties find that they
cannot do business with the companies involved or that they can
do so only on less favorable terms than those given by the parties
to one another or to the joint venture. The question then arises
under Article 85 of the EC Treaty whether the parties should be
entitled to refuse to do business with third parties or be entitled
to give third parties less favorable terms than they give to one
another. It is not possible to give a simple and clear answer to
this question because it can arise in a wide variety of different
situations. It is clear, however, that in granting an individual exemption under Article 85 for an agreement, the Commission
may require the parties to refrain from discriminating in favor of
thejoint venture or of one another if the existence or operations
of the joint venture or joint arrangement would otherwise impose a serious handicap on competitors that are denied ac13 1
cess.
Whether such a duty should be imposed depends on a

number of factors. It depends on the combined market shares
of the parent companies and the joint venture in both the relevant markets, and on the extent of the disadvantage imposed on
competitors, for example, the extent of foreclosure. It also depends on the extent to which competitors need to cooperate
with the parties and are, thus, dependent on satisfactory cooper131. In several Article 85 cases, the Commission imposed or took note of duties or
accepted undertakings not to discriminate against non-parties. IGR, COMMISSION OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, ELEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLIcY 1981, at 63-64,

§ 94 (1982); Amadeus-Sabre, in Temple Lang, supra note 51, at 317-22; DHL International, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, XXIsT REPORT ON COMPETITION PO-

icy 1991, at 71-72, §§ 88-89 (1992); Eirpage, O.J. L 306/22, [1991],

20; Infonet, COM-

MISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, XXIID REPORT ON COMPETITION PoLIcy 1992, at
416 (1993); EBUEurovision, O.J. L 179/23 (1993), Art. 2; Commission Decision No. 94/
579/EC, O.J. L 223/36 (1994)
57 (BT-MCI); Commission Decision No. 94/594/EC,
OJ. L 224/28, (1994) (ACI); Commission Decision No. 94/663/EC, O.J. L 259/20
(1994) (European Night Services); Gas Interconnector, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, XXVTH REPORT ON COMPETITION PoLcy 1995, at 39-40, § 82 (1996); Lufthansa-SAS, OJ. L 54/28 (1996), Article 3; Atlas-Phoenix-Global One, OJ. L 239/23
(1996); see Eurovision, O.J. L 179/23 (1993); Metro Grossmrirkte, Case 26/76 [1977]
E.C.R. 1875, at
20. In Nordic Satellite Distribution, the parties were willing to give an

undertaking not to discriminate, but the agreement was ultimately prohibited. OJ. L
53/20, at 40 (1996). Similar undertakings were also offered in MSG Media Service. O.J.
No L 364/1 (1994). This is because a merger which creates a dominant position contrary to Regulation 4064/89 cannot be made lawful merely by assurances that it will not

abuse its dominance. In these cases a duty not to discriminate was imposed without any
finding of dominance, although in some of the cases such a finding could certainly
have been made.
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ation from them and on what alternatives are available to competitors. It also depends on whether membership in the arrangement is freely open to competitors and whether there is
any justification that may be available for denying the benefit of
the arrangement to non-parties. A duty may be imposed even if
the parties are not controlling a facility that is so essential that
non-parties could not do business without it. Access on non-discriminatory terms may involve a competitor complying with certain criteria or requirements or making an appropriate contribution to the joint operations; there is never a duty to provide better terms to non-parties than to parties. It is also relevant to
know whether the parties could share with competitors the same
services on the same terms without decreasing the benefits of the
arrangement to themselves, apart from the fact that they would
no longer have that particular advantage over their competitor.
It is always also relevant to ask whether the benefits of the arrangements are obtained primarily by the parties or are obtained
directly by consumers as well, for example, in the case of airlines
computerized reservation systems and telephone companies' reciprocal use of their networks. The duty to grant access arises
only if without it the market would not be competitive, for example, there would be too few companies left that did not suffer
from a significant handicap as a result of being denied access to
the joint arrangement. How much the joint arrangement
reduces competition between the parties to it, and how much, if
at all, it would be possible, satisfactory, and procompetitive for
competitors not involved in one joint operation to set up a rival
one of their own that would do substantially the same things in
the same geographical area, in competition with the first joint
operation (intersystem cooperation) is also relevant.
The strict legal basis for this is that any multicompany or
joint venture arrangement that substantially restricts competition needs to comply with the four requirements of Article 85(3)
of the EC Treaty. In the case of arrangements involving control
of an important facility, the crucial legal requirement is usually
that restrictive agreements must not enable the parties to eliminate competition with respect to a substantial part of the goods
or services concerned. So, joint ventures and similar arrangements are usually required to license competitors on non-discriminatory terms when, if they were not so required, the parties
would be in a position to eliminate competition in respect of a
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"substantial" part of the products concerned either by refusing
to supply competitors or by supplying them only on less
favorable terms. This is a lower threshold than in the case of a
single dominant company because a dominant company normally has no duty to supply if there is even one alternative
source available, except in the special case of joint dominance.
Also, if the joint venture does license competitors, Article
85 (1) of the EC Treaty directly prohibits second-line discrimination because the shareholders cannot do through the joint venture what they could not do directly by agreement.
One problem of non-discrimination obligations is that a
third party will not necessarily know that it is being discriminated against. The Commission does not have the manpower to
carry out all the investigations that might be necessary. The only
effective way of ensuring that such an obligation is carried out in
the absence of a sector-specific regulation may be to oblige the
companies concerned to record formally all their dealings with
all the companies to whom access has been given, to require auditors to certify the correctness of the record for the purposes of
comparison, and, if necessary, to subject the records to supervision by the Commission. This was done in the Atlas-Phoenix2
Global One decisions.13
A separate, but related, issue arises when a dominant upstream company, such as a content provider, proposes to enter
into a joint venture with a telecommunications carrier that will
give them control over an essential facility such as a decoder for
encrypted TV signals. This was the situation in the MSG Media
Serice1 3 and Nordic Satellite"M cases and the Commission prohibited the mergers.13 5 This type of problem is particularly acute if
the owner of an essential facility is obtaining from a competitor
financing for investment in, for example, decoders, and the parties want this investment to entitle them to exclusive use of the
facilities.
In deciding whether there should be a duty to grant access,
different considerations arise in different kinds of multi-company situations:
132.
133.
134.
135.

Atlas-Phoenix-Global One, O.J. L 239/23 (1996).
MSG Media Service, O.J. L 364/1 (1994).
Commission Decision No. 96/17/EC, O.J. L 53/20 (1996).
Id. at 40; MSG Media Service, O.J. L 364/1, at 20 (1994).
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" Cooperation between competitors may be essential to
carry out the operations in question, as in the case of
banks' check clearing systems and airlines' interlining arrangements. Such arrangements are better the more participants there are, and inter-system competition is unimportant because there is unlikely to be scope for more
than one system. Network externalities magnify disadvantages of exclusion and reduce the viability of otherwise efficient competitors. Exclusion would be hard to justify, as
it would create a category of second-class competitors, unless admission would reduce the efficiency of the network;
" Where cooperation is needed to provide a service for all
the participants that could not be provided otherwise because of, for example, insufficient economies of scale.
This type of case typically raises issues about the capacity
of the joint operations and whether another group of
competitors could jointly set up a rival operation. Because
an arrangement that reduces costs is procompetitive and
does not impose any handicap on competitors or deny
them the possibility of cutting costs in the same or any
other way, there is normally no duty to give access to competitors;
* Cases in which an essential facility has been developed by
one company primarily for its own use and ownership
later is shared with other companies using it are often a
subset of the situations in which the joint venture owning
the essential facility is in a dominant position. That the
users are also shareholders does not significantly alter the
legal or economic position;
" In cases in which a consortium of users or buyers have
joined together to get control of an important source of
supply, from which they had previously bought but that
none of them had previously owned controlled or developed. The right of third parties to get access is likely to be
clear, as otherwise the arrangement would be similar to a
collective boycott;
* When competitors have set up a pool of patents, particularly if the patents are complementary, and if the combination cannot be duplicated or invented around, in particular if the patents constitute a defacto standard, they are
obliged to license all the patents needed by non-parties to
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compete;13 6 and
9 Often in telecommunications or rail transport, a consortium sets up a joint venture that will use all of the facilities
owned by the parties in different geographical areas, and
it would be difficult or impossible for any other competitor or consortium to set up a similar network of facilities
in all the same areas. In such circumstances, competitors
would normally have a right of access under Article 85 of
the EC Treaty, apart from any specific measures on telecommunications or railways, at least if the areas in the
Community to which the network in question controls access are "substantial."
To summarize, when competitors together create, own, or
operate an important facility, access to which is essential for the
competitiveness of the market and of non-participant competitors, and where admission of non-participants is compatible with
the legitimate purposes of the joint arrangement, the participants may be obliged to grant access to competitors on non-discriminatory terms.
It will be seen that in multi-company and joint venture cases
almost all of the same kinds of problems arise as in the case of
single-firm ownership of an essential facility. It may be necessary
to ensure that access is available to other competitors to enable
them to compete without a serious handicap. On the other
hand, it may be significantly procompetitive to allow the parties
to keep for themselves the benefits of their investment or their
ingenuity. There is, however, usually an important difference in
relation to transaction costs. In a multi-company situation, there
are already agreements between the companies involved. It is,
therefore, usually not difficult to determine what effects non-discriminatory terms would have on a competitor.
When the essential facilities principle is better known, it will
lead in many cases to parties entering into contracts that they
might not have made without the transaction costs of litigation
or Commission procedures. The rule merely makes it more
likely that contracts will be entered into and influences the terms
of these contracts.

136. IGR, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, ELEvENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1981, at 63, § 94 (1982).
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0. Non-Discriminationas a Condition

In a number of cases in which joint ventures have been authorized, the Commission has imposed a requirement that the
parent companies do not discriminate in favor of the joint venture. If such a requirement is embodied in a condition in a formal decision, the result would be clear, any discrimination would
make the authorization inapplicable. The situation is less clear
if the agreement is permitted on the basis of undertakings from
the parent companies not to discriminate, but undertakings are
normally equivalent to conditions.""7 If the duty not to discriminate is expressed to be a mere obligation, the breach of the obligation means that companies may be fined or the exemption
withdrawn, but it does not mean that the exemption becomes
inapplicable automatically with immediate effect.
The legal consequences, however, can be more complex.
For example, if one of three or more parent companies discriminates in violation of a condition, the exemption may cease to
apply to the relations between the others as well. Furthermore,
if the companies concerned do not challenge the imposition of a
condition within the time limits specified by Article 173 of the
EC Treaty, they cannot subsequentiy claim that a condition is
too strict and that an obligation would have been sufficient.
This is important because it means that the effect of breach of
the condition is genuinely automatic. The Commission does not
need to adopt a second decision making a finding that the
breach is important enough to activate the condition. Finally, if
a condition is infringed and the exemption ceases to apply, it
seems that third parties could recover compensation for loss
caused to them by the operation of the agreement during the
time when the agreement was not exempt, even if the loss was
not caused by the breach of the condition specifically.
P. PricingAbuses, Selective Pricing, and Cross-subsidies by Dominant
Companies
In brief, the rules of Community competition law about selective pricing and cross-subsidies by dominant companies are as
follows:
0 Predatory pricing is unlawful if it infringes one of the two
137. Temple Lang, supra note 51, at 368-89.

788

FORDHAMNTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 20:717

AKZO judgment tests; 13

* Article 86(c) of the EC Treaty prohibits second line discrimination, i.e., price or other differences that distort
competition between the customers of the dominant enterprise;
* Article 86 prohibits first line discrimination, for example,
prices that are lower if the buyer buys exclusively from the
39
dominant company, an exclusionary abuse;'
" Article 86 prohibits excessively high prices;
138. Akzo Chemie, Case C 62/86, [1991] E.C.R. 1-3359, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. 215;
Luc Gyselen, Abuse of Monopoly Power Within the Meaning of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty:
Recent Developments, in 1989 Foiwf.m

CoRP. L. INST. 597, 617-36 (Barry Hawk ed.,

1990). It has already been mentioned that these tests are not appropriate where the
marginal cost of additional production is near to zero. In essence, the difficulty seems
to be this: the Court in Akzo said a dominant company has no reason to price below
average variable cost, except intent to eliminate a competitor, because every sale generates an additional loss. AKZO, [1991] E.C.R. at 1-3455-56, 1 71-72. But if every additional sale costs almost nothing and brings in a sum greater than its variable cost, it is
not irrational to make additional sales and they cannot be attributed, without more, on
the basis of the Akzojudgment criteria, to an intention to exclude a competitor. Clearly
if nothing is added to the Akzo criteria, dominant companies selling products or services of which the variable cost is near-zero, which are relatively common in high technology industries, have much scope for putting competitors out of business by what
would be widely regarded as predation.
The right approach, it is suggested, is analogous to that in air transport cases,
where the question of whether predation is occurring is answered not by comparing the
price at which the last seat is sold and the marginal cost of flying one more passenger in
it. Instead, one should look at the fares charged for all the seats and the number of
seats sold or likely to be sold on each flight in each fare category. Predation occurs if,
on the basis of the aggregate sales, the cost of the flight exceeds expected revenues and
it would be cheaper to keep the plane on the ground. Even this apparently simple
principle is not always easy to apply to modem airline practices of yield management,
but it clearly prohibits planned and systematic overall loss-making operations. In industries where the marginal cost of additional production is near to zero, it is suggested
that the test to be applied is whether a company charges a price for goods and services
which, although above the average variable cost of providing the specific goods or services for which the price in question is paid, is so low that its overall revenues for all the
goods or services in question would be less than its average variable costs of providing
them if it sold the same proportion of its output at the same price on a continuing
basis, even where no intent to exclude a competitor is proved.
This principle, if it is accepted, would limit both the volume and the price of goods
sold at near-zero marginal cost, and make it unlawful for a dominant company deliberately to charge, on a selective or ad hoc basis, a combination of prices which it would
not be rational to sustain except for exclusionary purposes. Subject to that, however,
and leaving aside start-up situations, this principle would not prevent legitimate lossminimizing by dominant companies. See William G. Shephard, Assessing "Predatoy"Actions by Market Shares and Selectivity, 1986 ArrrRusT BuLL. 1 (1986).
139. Cooperativevereniging VA v. Commission, joined Cases 40/73 and others,
[1976] E.C.R. 1663, 1999, 2004, 1 C.M.L.R. 295 [hereinafter Suiker Unie]; Hoffmann
LaRoche v. Commission, Case 85/76, [1979] E.C.R. 461, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 211; NV
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* Discrimination by a dominant enterprise on the grounds
law, 14 0 at least if it
of nationality is contrary to 1Community
41
is substantial or systematic;
* It is contrary to Article 86 if a dominant company sells
both a raw material and an end product at prices that are
so close to one another that a reasonably efficient competitor buying the raw material could not make a profit and
would be forced out of business. 142 This can be regarded
as a price squeeze, as raising competitor's costs, or as providing an essential facility at an uneconomic price. A defense that the dominant company's downstream operations are exceptionally competitive is permissible, but exceptionally clear cost accounts would be essential to prove
it; and
" Cross-subsidizing is likely to be unlawful if the dominant
company uses profits from an area in which it has a dominant position to subsidize the production and sale of
products or services in another area in which it faces competition. 143 Unlawful cross-subsidizing could be by funding one operation with capital remunerated substantially
below the market rate, or providing premises, equipment,
or services at less than the market price. There is no reason why this principle should be limited to cases in which
there is a monopoly, although the Commission called attention to the principle in connection with telecommunications monopolies.
The Court of Justice has accepted that cross-subsidization
be
contrary to Article 86 of the EC Treaty, but has not had
can
an opportunity to consider what circumstances would necessitate
such a finding.14'
Nederlandische Baden-Industrie Michelin v. Commission, Case 322/81, [1983] E.C.R.
3461, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 282.
140. Sacchi, Case 155/73, [1974] E.C.R. 409, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 177; Commission
Decision No. 81/1030/EEC, O.J. L 370/49, (1981).
141. See Commission Guideline, O.J. C 233/2, 120 (1991) (concerning application of EEC competition rules in telecommunications Sector).
142. See Commission Decision No. 76/185/ECSC, O.J. L 35/6 (1976) (National
Carbonising); Commission Decision No. 88/518/EEC, O.J. L 284/41 (1988) (British
Sugar),

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EIGHTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETI-

PoLcY 1989, at 80 (1990).
102-10 (1991) (concerning ap143. See Commission Guideline, OJ. C 233/2,
plication of EEC competition rules in telecommunications sector).
144. SeePort of Genoa, Case C 179/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5889, 1-5929 19, [1994] 4
C.M.L.R. 422, 445 (discussing that exclusive rights led monopoly to reduce prices to
certain consumers and offset reductions by charging other consumers more).
TION
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Not every cross-subsidization by a dominant company is unlawful. It is unlawful only if it has a substantial exclusionary effect and if it cannot be justified because cross-subsidizing of a
downstream operation by a vertically integrated dominant company is unlawful (the price squeeze cases). It is natural that
cross-subsidizing by a horizontally integrated dominant company
can also be unlawful if it has substantial effects. Cross-subsidizing different customers within the area of monopoly is lawful
because it has no effect on competition and because it may be
essential to maintain a widespread service on an economic basis
overall.14 5 It may be illegal for a dominant company to offer at a
low price a combination of products or services, if it has a dominant position for some of them and not for others, if the effect is
that a competitor providing only the latter would have to offer a
discount so large that it would be uneconomic, sometimes called
"financial tying." Finally, where a dominant company is able to
discriminate between its customers, more common with services
that cannot be traded than with products that can, and the dominant company has a policy of responding to competitors by selectively offering low prices to warn off competitors or discourage them from price competition, these kinds of behavior can
also be unlawful. These are less precisely defined types of unlawful pricing behavior in Community law.
Q. Interim Measures in Rapidly ChangingIndustries
In an industry that is changing rapidly, it is sometimes important for the Commission to act quickly in order to enable a
competitor to enter a market or to prevent a competitor being
forced out. Prompt action is especially important when the first
mover has a substantial advantage.
The Commission has adopted few interim measure decisions since the Court ruled that it had the power to adopt them
in 1980.146 Nevertheless, the requirements for interim measures
145. Regie des Postes v. Corbeau, Case C 320/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-2533, [1995] 4
C.M.L.R. 621.
146. Camera Care Ltd. v. Commission, Case 792/79 R, [1980] E.C.R. 119, [1980] 1
C.M.L.R. 334; BLANco, supra note 31, at 283-92; Pastor & Van Ginderachter, Laproddure
en rfr, REV.TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPIEN 25(4), 561-621 (1989) (discussing interim measures adopted by Community Courts in Luxembourg on basis of similar principles). Article 4a of Regulation 3975/87, which provides an especially quick interim
measures procedure in air transport cases, has never been used. See Regulation 1284/
91, O.J. L 122/2 (1991).
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have been regarded as fairly clear. There must be prima facie
evidence of a violation of Article 85 or Article 86 of the EC
Treaty. There must be evidence of a risk of serious and irreparable damage or intolerable damage to complainants, or intolerable damage to the public interest, giving rise to an urgent need
to adopt interim measures. The Commission will balance the
interests involved. It will compare the consequences for all parties of doing nothing with the consequences of adopting interim
measures of the kind requested. Interim measures can be ordered, on these conditions, in order to ensure that the final decision of the Commission will be effective, for example, that the
complainant will not be forced into liquidation before the case is
over or will not irretrievably lose an important first mover advantage in an uncompetitive market. Interim measures need not
merely preserve the status quo before the presumed violation.
The Court of First Instance orders interim measures on essentially the same grounds as the Commission. Among the interim
measures that it can make are orders suspending the operation
of decisions of the Commission. This gives rise to at least one
paradox that has not been fully resolved.
If the Commission orders interim measures on the basis of a
prima fade case, there is often a primafacie case to be made also
for saying that the Commission's decision is wrong and that the
defendant will suffer serious and irreparable harm if the Commission's decision stands. This might lead the Court of First Instance to suspend the Commission's decision, thereby depriving
the complainant or the public of the protection that the Commission's decision had been intended to give.
The paradox is accentuated in the case of a final decision of
the Commission. Such a decision is not based on a prima facie
finding of infringement, but a fully considered ruling. If on the
basis of such a ruling the Commission orders the defendant to
change its behavior on a lasting basis, the defendant may be able
to argue that it would suffer serious and irreparable harm if the
Commission's decision is not suspended while the case is before
the Court of First Instance. Because it is the President and not
the Court of First Instance who orders interim measures, applications for interim measures are rarely rejected on the grounds
that not even a primafacie case has been made to show that the
Commission's decision is wrong. The reason is that if the President rejected a request on this ground, he would preempt the
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final judgment of the Court of First Instance. The result is that
apart from balance of interests arguments, whether a company
that the Commission has ordered to alter its behavior can have
the Commission's decision suspended often depends in practice
on whether it can show that it is sufficiently likely to suffer serious damage.
If Commission decisions were suspended on evidence of a
small risk of damage or of certain but slight damage, the result
might be that in many cases the Commission's efforts to change
the market would be delayed for the duration of the proceedings in the Court of First Instance and even the subsequent appeal to the Court ofJustice. This period might be far too long in
a rapidly changing industry and might seriously reduce competition, prejudice complainants, and unjustifiably benefit defendants.
In all such cases, whether the Commission's decision will be
suspended depends, apart from balance of interests arguments,
on the evidence put before the President, often hurriedly, at the
interim measures hearing. Few deductions, therefore, can safely
be made for other cases. Nevertheless, complainants feel concerned by orders made by the two courts
in Luxembourg in the
147
Atlantic ContainerLines ("TAA") case.
In this case, the Commission's decision prohibiting price
fixing was suspended on the grounds that it involved major
changes in the way the shipping companies operated, which
might be difficult to reverse if their action was successful and
which might compromise the stability of the market. If the shipping companies finally lose, they would be liable to pay compensation for the whole period of the court proceedings to the companies who suffer loss as a result of the suspension. The price
fixing had been going on since 1986 and even earlier, and this
influenced the result. One should not deduce from these orders
that, even in cases in which the infringement is as clear as in the
case of price fixing, Commission decisions will be suspended if
termination of the infringement could lead to major changes in
147. Order of the President of the Court of First Instance, Case T 395/95 R, Atlantic Containers Line and others, Mar. 10, 1995 ; Order of the President of the Court of
Justice, Case C 149/95 P(R),July 19, 1995. But see Case T 52/96 R, Sogecable v. Commission, order datedJuly 12, 1996 (stating that interim measures will not be ordered to

suspend Commission procedure under the Merger Regulation because Court's role is
to supervise Commission and not to replace it).
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the market. In most cases, complainants' interests would be entifled to more weight than they were in Atlantic ContainerLines,
where the complainants said that although they would be entitled to compensation, they would have trouble proving the
amount of compensation that should be paid. The Court of
First Instance will certainly be careful not to suspend Commission decisions regularly, as this would risk impeding or postponing the operation of Community competition policy. If a complainant were being forced out of the market or prevented from
entering the market, the result would almost certainly be different. The Commission considers that it has power to order in148
terim measures to allow a new competitor to enter the market,
and, if it needed to use this power, it is unlikely that its decision
would be suspended, because suspension would lead to the competitor being forced out of the market again. A competitor,
however, is not entitled to interim measures merely to allow it to
enter the market sooner than if it had to wait for the Commission's final decision. It must be able to show a substantial first
mover advantage that is so significant that these cases are "it is
now or never" cases in order to justify interim measures, and it
must show that the market it wishes to enter is uncompetitive.
But, it is precisely in industries undergoing fast technological
change that the first mover advantage is likely to be important
and easy to prove.
R. Joint Dominance in High Technology Industries
The circumstances in which ajoint dominant position exists
and in which it is abused have not yet been fully clarified by the
case law of the Community courts or the practice of the Commission. The law is still developing. The words of Article 86 of the
EC Treaty make it clear that it applies when more than one company shares a dominant position. It is clear that the words of
Article 86 must add something to Article 85. It would be contrary to all the usual principles of interpretation of the EC Treaty
to believe that the words were pointless and without practical
effect.
148. Sea Containers v. Stena Sealink, OJ. L 15/8 (1994); see RTF-/TP, [1995]
E.C.R. at 1-743, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. at 718; Temple Lang, supra note 22 at 289-91, 292-93;
see IGR, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, ELEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POUCY 1981, at 63-64, § 94 (1982).
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In brief, the law seems to be as follows: for two or more
companies to be jointly dominant, they must be in the same geographical market. Two companies, each dominant in a separate
geographical market, are not the same as two jointly dominant
companies. For two or more companies to be in a joint dominant position, they must together have substantially the same position vis-d-vis their customers and competitors as a single company has if it is in a dominant position. In addition, there must
be no competition, or no significant competition, between the
companies in question, at least with respect to the behavior of
the lawfulness of what is in question. If the absence of significant competition between the companies is sufficiently clear so
that in practice the behavior of one company is not constrained
by the competitive reactions of the other, there does not seem to
be any reason in law or in economic theory to say that any other
economic link between the companies is necessary.1 4 9
The next question that arises is what kind of behavior constitutes an abuse in situations ofjoint dominance. It is clear that
if both or all the companies practice behavior that would be contrary to Article 86 of the EC Treaty in the case of a single dominant company, both or all of them are acting illegally if they are
in fact jointly dominant. In some sectors, such as telecommunications, the problem that is most likely to arise in practice is
where there are two alternative facilities and access to one but
not both is essential for service providers. One should not assume that in such circumstances there is necessarily joint dominance. Joint dominance does not exist if the companies in question compete vigorously with one another and on relatively
equal terms and if, in any case, it will be some considerable time
before alternative networks become so competitive that many of
today's incumbent national telecommunications operators cease
to be solely dominant on their national territories.
If there are two companies, each of which can offer a facility
that is essential for downstream competition, and if there is competition between them, one would expect that one or both of
them would be willing to provide access to any enterprise that
149. Commission Decision No. 92/553/EEC, OJ. L 356/1, at 24-25 (1992) [hereinafter Nestl6-Perrier]; Temple Lang, supra note 51, at 360-65; Antoine Winckler &
Marc Hansen, Collective Dominance under the EC Merger Control Regulation, 30 COMMON
MKT. L.REv. 787 (1993).
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needed it. If neither was willing to do so and if there was no
technical or commercial justification for the refusal, national
regulatory authorities might resolve the problem by ordering
one or both of the companies to offer access. It is not easy to
visualize clearly circumstances in which no national order for access would be made despite the absence of technical or commercial reasons for refusing it. But, refusals by two companies in a
joint dominant position to provide access, even in the absence of
any concerted practice between them, could be a violation of
Article 86 by both of them, if their anticompetitive motives for
refusing access were sufficiently clear. Duopolists that are immune from competition and that behave similarly to protect
their downstream operations from competition cannot defend
themselves successfully merely by proving that they acted independently of one another. Neither duopolist can avoid the duty
to provide access merely by saying that the other might have provided it. Abuse by duopolists is probably less likely in developing, high technology markets than in mature and static markets.
The Gencor/Lonhro decision15 ° of the Commission in 1996
was a decision preventing the establishment of a duopoly and
was not concerned with abuse of a joint dominant position
under Article 86. In the decision, the Commission noted,
"[s] imilar negative effects which arise from a dominant position
held by one firm arise from a dominant position held by an oligopoly. Such a situation can occur where a mere adaptation by
members of the oligopoly to market conditions causes anticompetitive parallel behavior whereby the oligopoly becomes dominant." 151 Active collusion would, therefore, not be required for
the members of the oligopoly to become dominant and to behave to an appreciable extent independently of their remaining
competitors, their customers, and, ultimately, the consumers.
S. When Can Litigation to Enforce the Legal Rights of a Dominant
Company Be Contrary to Article 86?

In general, a dominant company is free to enforce its legal
rights just as any other company is, even against competitors. If
the defendant in such a situation argues that because the plain150. Commission Decision No. 97/26/EC, O.J. L 11 (1997) [hereinafter Gencor/
Lonhro].
151. Id. at 140.
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tiff is dominant it does not have the legal right that it claims, that
question will be decided by the national court, if necessary with
advice from the Court of Justice under Article 177 of the EC
Treaty or with information given by the Commission. 152 Such a
situation might arise, for example, if a dominant company relied
on a contract that a defendant said was invalid or unenforceable
because it was contrary to Article 86 or if the defendant said the
dominant company was not permitted to rely on an intellectual
property right because to do so was contrary to Article 86.",3 In
such circumstances, the Commission would not normally begin a
procedure of its own, because it would expect the national court
to deal with the case appropriately, and the Commission is not
an appellate tribunal from a national court. If the national court
needs guidance on a question of Community law, it can get guidance from the Court of Justice under Article 177 of the EC
Treaty.
The Commission, however, will act on a complaint in some
rather similar situations. One such situation is where a dominant company makes a practice of systematically threatening litigation against competitors or a practice of registering trademarks or other intellectual property rights that it does not use
154
and that create barriers to entry for competitors.
It is not easy to express the relevant principle precisely.
Nevertheless, it seems that it is an abuse of a dominant position
to threaten litigation or to bring proceedings if the dominant
company is not merely reasonably exercising its apparent legal
rights but is carrying out a systematic campaign or strategy to
intimidate or create difficulties for competitors or to raise unreasonably their costs, based on litigation in which it is unlikely to
succeed, in order to reduce the competition to which it is exposed.
152. O.J. No. C 31/6 (1993) (discussing notice on cooperation between national
courts and the Commission in applying Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty).
153. CICRA v. Renault, Case 53/87 [1988] E.C.R. 6039, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 265;
Volvo, [1988] E.C.R. at 6211, [1989] C.M.L.R. at 122; RTE-ITP, [1995] E.C.R. at 1-743,
[1995] 4 C.M.L.R. at 718.
154. See Osram/Airam, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, ELEVENTH

REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1981, at 66, § 97 (1982) (discussing registration of

trademakers including the syllable "ram" and objections to the use of a competitor's
company name); Hild AG v. Commission, Case T-30/89, [1991] E.C.R. 11-1439, 11-148283, 99, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 16, 45 (Ct. of First Instance) (explaining that deliberately
claiming a licence payment six times higher than ultimately awarded is an abuse).
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III. COMMUNITY COMPETITION LAW iN REGULATED
IMUSTRIES
Industries and activities that are liberalized in accordance
with Community directives may still be regulated in some respects to manage the transition from monopoly to full competition. This situation gives rise to several notable points on competition law. First, in several cases, notably Atlas-Global One,15
the Commission has considered that liberalization on paper is
not enough to justify certain kinds of close cooperation and that
these can only be justified by actual licensing of competitors to
enter into previously monopolized markets. Secondly, the more
liberalized a market is, the more important it is to ensure that
competition law is fully enforced. Thirdly, Community antitrust
law requires all the features of the relevant market to be taken
into account, including, if appropriate, that there is some degree
of supervision of prices by national regulatory authorities. If, for
example, a price squeeze by a dominant company is alleged,
however, the Commission will not dismiss the complaint merely
on the grounds that the national regulatory authority has power
to prevent an exclusionary squeeze, if it has not in fact done so.
The Commission will not assume that national authorities whose
primary responsibility is not antitrust law will necessarily take
whatever action is necessary to bring about the results required
by Community antitrust law.
A. Community Competition Law and Regulationsfor Specific
Industries
In several high technology industries, it is widely agreed that
there is a need for specific regulatory measures for the industry
in question, as well as for Community competition law. This is so
in particular in the biotechnology, genetic engineering, and telecommunications industries. This combination or coexistence of
two sets of legal rules raises several issues of Community law.
B. Should Regulatory Measures Be at the National or Community
Level?
The question as to whether regulatory measures should be
adopted at the national or Community level is answered, in part,
155. Commission Decision No. 96/546/EC, OJ. L 239/23 (1996).
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by Community law itself. Where, as in telecommunications,
there are industry-specific Community directives, they must be
implemented by whatever national measures are appropriate.
That is inherent in the concept of a directive under Article 189
of the EC Treaty. The need for implementing measures is not
lessened by the rule of Community law stating that if a Member
State fails to implement a directive, it cannot rely on or take advantage of its own failure when it or one of its national authori15 6
ties is a party in litigation in one of its own courts.
Of course, many activities within these industries are not
covered by Community directives. Insofar as they are not, Member States are free to legislate or regulate if they wish, subject
only to the rules of Community law mentioned below. Indeed,
the principle of subsidiarity, more a political principle than a
legal rule, but now written into the EC Treaty by the Treaty on
European Union, states says that the European Community may
take action only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States,
and, therefore, can be better achieved, by reason of the scale or
15 7
effects of the proposed action, by the European Community.
When the European Community has adopted a directive,
national measures implementing the directive must, if possible,
be interpreted to give effect to the directive, even if that is not
necessarily their normal interpretation.' 5 8 If a Member State
fails to implement a directive and its failure causes loss to a private party, it must pay compensation if the directive, on its correct interpretation, was intended to protect individual rights.'5 9
Measures implementing a directive must be drafted, equipped
with fines or other penalties, and enforced as effectively as simi156. Pubblico Ministero v. Ratti, Case 148/78 [1979] E.C.R. 1629, [1980] 1
C.M.L.R. 96; Oberfinanzdirektor des Kreises Borken v. Handelsonderneming Moorman
BV, Case 190/87, [1988] E.C.R. 4689, 4722, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 656.
157. Article 3b, as introduced by Article G of the Treaty on European Union; see
John Temple Lang, What Powers Should the European Community Have?, EUR. PUB. L. 97116 (1995).
158. Marleasing v. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion, Case C-106/89,
[1990] E.C.R. 14135, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 305; Coloroll Pension Trustees Ltd. v. Russell,
Case C-200/91, [1994] E.C.R. 1-4389.
159. Francovich v. Italy, Joined Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5357,
[1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 66; Brasseries du Pecheur, joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, [1995]
[1996] All E.R. (E.C.) 301, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 889;John Temple Lang, New Legal Effects
Resultingfrom the Failureof States to Fulfil Obligations underEuropean Community Law: The
FrancovichJudgment, 16 Fo.DH" Ir'L LJ. 1 (1992).
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lar or corresponding rules of national law and rigorous enough
60
to provide effective enforcement of the Community law rules.1
In practice, the national measures implementing directives are
integrated fully into national measures adopted to achieve
purely national objectives, although the directives must prevail if
there is any conflict.
Although, except in the directives themselves, the Commission does not try to promote further harmonization of national
legislation, it is both desirable and inevitable that national regulators that are dealing with similar problems will adopt similar
solutions. There is a certain amount of informal exchange of
drafts and information between national regulatory authorities
in the industries in question. This may need to be encouraged.16 1 Essentially, national measures can complement
Community directives in two ways: they can implement the directives by going into details not addressed in the directives
themselves or they can address other issues not touched on at all
by the directives.
C. Issues for National Regulation
In the field of telecommunications, national regulations are
needed to ensure that vertically integrated, dominant companies
maintain separate cost accounting for each of their activities, so
that regulators can ensure that unfair cross-subsidies and discrimination in favor of a dominant company's own activities are
avoided. This is particularly important for interconnection
charges that constitute a high proportion of the costs of competitors of the dominant infrastructure owner. In fact, the necessary regulations do little more than oblige dominant companies
to gather cost accounting data that a well run telecommunications company should already have. Although separate cost accounting is not directly or expressly required by Community antitrust law, it may become necessary to require it. Using Article
160. See e.g., Public Prosecutor v. Vandevenne, Case C-7/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-4371,
[1993] 3 C.M.L.R. 608; Commission v. United Kingdom, Case C-382/92. [1994] E.C.R.
1-2435, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 345; Commission v. United Kingdom, Case C-383/92, [1994]
E.C.R. 1-2479, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R 345.
161. See Barry E. Hawk & Laraine Laudati, Antitrust Federalism in the United States
and Decentralizationof Competition Law in the European Union: A Comparison, 20 FoRDAM
INT'L LJ. 49 (1996) (arguing that EC Member States need association of leaders of
national competition authorities in order to create more effective competition laws).
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90(3), vertically integrated dominant companies ought to practice it 16 2 for antitrust reasons as well as regulatory and management purposes.
National regulators have to consider how far it is necessary
or desirable to impose on non-dominant companies obligations
corresponding to those imposed on dominant companies under
national regulatory regimes. In the biotechnological industry,
national regulators are much less concerned with economic and
financial issues such as those under antitrust law than with public health, ethical issues (cruelty to animals, use of human tissues), and environmental pollution, although national rules on
these issues may affect competition significantly even when they
apply formally to all competitors by raising barriers to entry or by
prohibiting the use of cheap but environmentally damaging
technologies.
D. National or Community Level-Some InstitutionalIssues
A study carried out for the Commission 16 suggested a
number of options on how best to regulate the telecommunications industry. The study stated that in most Member States
there is at present only limited cooperation between the national
competition authority and the national telecommunications regulatory authority. Also, there is only limited cooperation between the various regulatory authorities and even between the
various competition authorities. The situation, however, is evolving rapidly. After full scale liberalization and the first round of
national regulation, which has only recently begun in some
Member States, the study explains that competition law will be
more important than national regulation and that competition
questions will have to be addressed by the European Commission rather than by national authorities. The main options for a
new regulatory institutional system are an authority independent
of the Community institutions (this would probably involve
amending the Community treaties and would create the kind of
problems raised by. the European Economic Area)," a legal
162. Temple Lang, supra note 22, at 294-95.
163. FORRESTER, NORALL & SUTrON, THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE REGULATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE APPLICATION OF EC COMPETITION RULES
(1996).
164. See Court ofJustice, Opinion 1/91, O.J. C 110/1, [1991] E.C.R. 1-6079,1-6101,
1 C.M.L.R. 245, and Opinion 1/92, [1992] E.C.R. 1-2821, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 217 (re-
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framework giving the Commission regulatory powers, an advisory agency to coordinate, monitor and express opinions (but
without legal powers) and consolidation of existing committees.
Opinion in governmental circles in the European Community at present, however, may not be in favor of setting up wholly
new institutions. Also, setting up any new body with real powers
would tend to delay rather than promote liberalization of the
industry. One of the two less radical options is, thus, probably
most likely to be adopted. These would raise few legal problems.
This Article does not address the constitutional issues that would
be raised by the more radical first and second options.
What this means is that there is at present no Community
equivalent of the U.S. Federal Communications Commission,
either for telecommunications or for broadcasting. It may come
to be considered that telecommunications cannot be satisfactorily regulated, to whatever extent may be thought necessary, by
national regulators working closely together and acting within a
Community law framework. If this conclusion is finally reached,
a choice will have to be made between the more radical options
mentioned above. It seems unlikely that there will be a single
Community authority dealing with broadcasting, among other
reasons, because telecommunications is subject to federal jurisdiction in Germany and broadcasting is not. The German
Ldnder would object strongly to a Community broadcasting authority, but would not object to the Federal Government transferring some of its powers to a Community telecommunications
authority.
E. The Rules of Community Law on National Regulatory Measures
There are a number of general rules of Community law that
apply to national regulatory measures.
1. Independence of Regulators
An industry must not be regulated by the companies in the
industry themselves or by a state-owned or dominant company in
the industry. Regulators must be independent of the regulated
industry. Member States must not deprive their legislation of its
garding creation of the European Economic Area); see Temple Lang, InstitutionalAspeas of EC-EFTA Relations, in CREATING A EUROPEAN ECONOMIC SPACE: LEGAL AsPEctS OF
EG-EFTA RELATIONS 17-62 (Robinson & Findlater eds., 1990).
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official character by delegating to private companies responsibility for taking measures affecting the economic sphere. Advisory
committees are permissible, 165 however, and even a dominant
company
must be free to plan and manage its own business activities. 166

The Court has not had occasion to spell out all the consequences if a regulator is not sufficiently independent of the companies regulated. In theory, regulations might be wholly invalid

or merely ineffective against competitors. If the regulations really amount to a cartel or abuse of dominance in the guise of
governmental responsibility delegated to private parties, the
measure should presumably be looked at under Articles 85 and
86 of the EC Treaty. This issue may become important insofar as
companies are given defacto power to adopt standards that if validly adopted would be legally binding on their competitors.
Although Article 86 does not contain a clause corresponding to
Article 85(2), it seems clear that clauses that infringe Article 86
are void, at least as against the dominant company.
2. National Competition Authorities Applying Community
Competition Law
Regulatory authorities, even if they are not regarded as competition authorities or expressly empowered to apply national or
Community competition law, have an important duty not to approve any agreement, including price fixing agreements, practice, or behavior that is contrary to Community competition law,
whether Article 85 or Article 86.167
165. Van Eycke v. Aspa NV, Case 267/86, [1988] E.C.R. 4769, (1990] C.M.L.R.
330; Francev. Commission, [1991] E.C.R. at 1-2526-72, 51, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at 574-75;
RTT v. GB-Inno-BM, Case C-18/88, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5941, [1994] 1 C.E.C. (CCH) 117;
Centro Servisi Spediporto Srl v. Spedizione Marittima del Golfo Srl, Case C-96/94,
[1995] E.C.R. 1-2883, [1996] 4 C.M.L.R. 613; Procurer de la Republic v. Thierry
Tranchant, Case C-91/94, [1995] E.C.R. 1-3911, 4 C.M.L.R. 74;John Temple Lang, European Community Competition Law and Member State Action, 10 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 11432 (1989).
166. See British Telecom, [1985] E.C.R. at 886, [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. at 382.
167. Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Silver Line Reisburo GmbH v. Zentrale zur
Bekampfung unlanteren Wettbewerbs e.V., Case 66/86, [1989] E.C.R. 803, [1990] 4
C.M.L.R. 102; Costanzo v. Comune di Milano, Case 103/88, [1989] E.C.R. 1839 31,
[1989] 3 C.M.L.R. 239; John Temple Lang, European Community ConstitutionalLaw and
the Enforcement of Community Antitrust Law, in 1993 FORDHAM CORP. L. INsT. 525, 580-83
(Barry Hawk ed., 1994). The duty of national courts to avoid conflicts with Commission
decisions was confirmed in Dijkstra. Hendrik Evert Dijkstra v. Friesland (Frico Domo)
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National competition authorities should be given express
powers by national legislation to apply Community competition
law.' 6 ' Whether it would be useful also to give such express powers to a national regulatory authority depends on the extent to
which, in practice, the authority in question is acting as a competition authority or taking antitrust arguments into account. It is
clearly desirable, to avoid duplication of procedures and unnecessary cost, that when a national regulatory authority deals with
an issue or with an individual case, it ensures that whatever result
is called for by Community antitrust is achieved, if it is convenient and appropriate for it to do so in the course of its procedure.
Regulators can bring about a situation in which they can, in
effect, apply rules corresponding to Community antitrust law by
writing clauses corresponding to Articles 85 and 86 of the EC
Treaty into the licenses they grant in the course of their activities. This is different, however, from having powers given by legislation to apply Community law, in at least some respects. The
interpretation of such clauses, even if their wording was identical
to Articles 85 and 86, could not be referred to the Court of Justice in Luxembourg under Article 177. The rights of third parties to compensation and injunctions would not necessarily be
the same as in the case of breach of Community competition
law. Furthermore, the Community law duties of national authorities to ensure observance of Community law would not apply to
pure rules of national law, even when they are obviously copied
from Community law.
National courts have a duty to raise questions of Community
law even if the parties have not done so.' 69 Because national
administrative authorities have the same duties as national
courts not to apply national law if it is inconsistent with CommuCooperatie BA and Others, Case C-319/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-4471, [1995] 5 C.M.L.R.
178.
168. See Commission Notice, OJ. C 262/07 (1996) (on cooperation between the
Commission and national competition authorities).
169. Verholen and Others v. Sociale Verzekeringsbank, Cases C-87-89/90, [1991]
E.C.R. 1-3757, 3772-73, [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 157; Amministrazione delle Finanze dello
Stato v. Simmenthal, Case 106/77, [1978] E.C.R. 629, 643, 16, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 263,
282-83; Peterbroeck van Campenhout SCS & Cie v. Belgium, Case C-312/93, [1996] 1
C.M.L.R. 793; Jeroen van Schijndel & Johannes van Veen v. Stichting Pensioenfonds
voor Fysiotherapeuten joined Cases C-430-431/93, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 801.
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nity law,1 70 they may also have a duty to raise questions of Com1 71
munity law on their own initiative.
National courts have a duty under Community constitutional law, in particular Article 5 of the EC Treaty, to give effective remedies for the protection of the rights afforded by EC
law. 172 If, under national law, the primary responsibility for applying Community competition law is in practice that of a national regulatory authority rather than the national competition
authority or the national courts, then the regulatory authority
would have a duty to provide effective remedies of whatever kind
is required by Community competition law.
If a national authority approves anything contrary to Community competition law, several consequences may follow. First,
the validity of the approval can be open to challenge in the national courts. Second, the Commission can proceed against the
companies involved in the usual way. It could not be bound by
the findings made or the approval given by the national authority. At most, that approval might help to protect the companies
against fines for anything done after the approval was given.
Third, the Member State might be in breach of its obligations
under Community law, and a procedure against it under Article
169 of the EC Treaty might be appropriate. Fourth, the national
authority or the Member State might have to pay compensation
for the protection of the rights of interested parties under Community law.
This duty of national authorities applies, as is clear from the
170. Fratelli Costanzo v. Comune di Milano, Case 103/88, [1989] E.C.R. 1839,
1871, [1989] 3 C.M.L.R. 239, 258.
171. This also seems to follow from Flugreisen, because one could not expect the
parties in such a case to mention issues of Community competition law which, if they
had any effect, would only be contrary to the parties' interests. Flugreisen, [1989] E.C.R
at 803, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. at 102.
172. See, e.g., Harz v. Deutsche Tradax, GmbH, Case 79/83, [1984] E.C.R. 1921,
1941-42 1 21-28, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 430, 452-54 (stating that compensation must be
adequate in relation to damage sustained.); Bozzetti v. Invernizzi SpA and Ministero del
Tesoro, Case 179/84, [1985] E.C.R. 2301, 2317-18, 17, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 246, 262;
Commission v. Greece, Case 68/88, [1989] E.C.R. 2965, 2984-85, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. 31;
Simmenthal, [1978] E.C.R. 629, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 263; Regina v. Secretary of State for
Transport ex parte Factortame Limited, Case C-213/89, 1990 E.C.R. 1-2433, [1990) 3
C.M.L.R. 1; Marshall v. Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Health Auth.
(Marshall II), Case C-271/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-4367, (1993] 3 C.M.L.R. 293; van
Schijndel, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 801; Factortame, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 889.
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Ahmed Saeed judgment, 17' even when the authority does not intend or purport to give any approval on the basis of Community
law. It seems to follow that if, for example, registration of a patent license is carried out only when the license is considered lawful under national law, the registering authority should on its
own initiative consider if there is any objection to the license
under Community law.
The duty of national regulatory authorities not to approve
anything contrary to Community law, including Community
competition law, is important because it is not clear that all such
authorities are in fact completely independent of the companies
that they are supposed to regulate. Also, even undeniably independent competition authorities like the U.K. Monopolies
Commission are not always fully competition minded.
3. National Restrictions on Competition
It is a general principle of Community law that Member
State measures that limit freedoms given or protected by Community law, even if they are non-discriminatory, must be for a
legitimate public or general-interest purpose and must be no
174
more restrictive than is essential to achieve that purpose.
Purely economic, protectionist aims are not legitimate. If the
permissible purpose is already assured by the law in another
Member State in which a company is established, the same obligations cannot be imposed a second time. This is a fundamental
principle of Community law which applies to services.
The Court has specifically stated, "economic aims, such as
that of securing for a national public foundation all the revenue
from advertising intended especially for the public of the Member State in question, cannot constitute grounds of public policy
173. F/ugreisen, [1989] E.C.R. at 803, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. at 102.
174. Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur Van de Bedrijfsvereniging Voor de Metaalnijverheid, Case 33/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1299, [1975] 2 C.M.L.R. 298; Sichting Collectieve
Antennevoorziening Gouda v. Commissariaat voor de Media, Case C-288/89, [1991]
E.C.R. 1-4007; EC Commission v. Netherlands, Case-353/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-4069, 14092-94,
11-20; see Bond van Adverteerders v. Netherlands, Case 352/85, [1988]
E.C.R. 2085, [1989] 3 C.M.L.R 113 (finding discriminatory restrictions on advertising
on television and freedom to provide services); see also TV10 SA v. Commissariaat voor
de media, Case C-23/93, [1994] E.C.R. 1-4795, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. 284. See generally PE.
TER OLIVER, THE FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (3d ed. 1996)

(explaining in depth free movement of goods).
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within the meaning of Article 56 of the Treaty." 175
Therefore, few lawyers were surprised when the Court
adopted the Corbeau judgment 17 6 on postal services. In that
judgment the Court wrote:
[T] he questions referred to the Court must be understood as
meaning that the national court is substantially concerned
with the question whether Article 90 of the Treaty must be
interpreted as meaning that it is contrary to that Article for
the legislation of a Member State which confers on a body
such as the R6gie des Postes the exclusive right to collect,
carry and distribute mail to prohibit an economic operator
established in that State from offering, under threat of
crimi1 77
nal penalties, certain specific services on that market.
The Court then referred to its previous case law ruling that
a statutory monopoly has exclusive rights under Article 90 and is
in a dominant position under Article 86. Article 90 applies to
Member State measures and prevents Member States from
adopting measures that might deprive Article 85 and 86 of their
effectiveness. The Court then went on to say that Article 90(2):
[P]ermits the Member States to confer on undertakings to
which they entrust the operation of services of general economic interest, exclusive rights that may hinder the application of the rules of the Treaty on competition insofar as restrictions on competition, or even the exclusion of all competition, by other economic operators are necessary to ensure
the performance of the particular tasks assigned
to the under17
takings possessed of the exclusive rights.

1

The Court continuted and explained:
[T]he R6gie des Postes is entrusted with a service of general
economic interest.... The question which falls to be consid175. Bond van Adverteerders, [1988] E.C.R. 2085, 2135,

34 [1989] 3 C.M.L.R. 113,

151.
176. Corbeau, [1993] E.C.R. at 1-2533, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. at 621. See Mario
Siragusa, Privatizationand EC Competition Law, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 999, 1053-58, 107478 (1996); Anthony Gardner, The Velvet Revolution: Article 90 and the Triumph of the Free
Market in Europe's Regulated Sectors, 16 EUR. COMP. L. REv. 78 (1995); Luc Gyselen, AntiCompetitive State measures Under the EC Treaty: Towards a Substantive Legality Standard,
1993 EUR. L. REv. 55-106; John Temple Lang, Community Antitrust Law and Government
Measures Relating to Public and PrivilegedEnterprises: Article 90 EEC Treaty, in 1984 FoRDHAM CoRP. L. INST. 543, 565-73 (Barry Hawk ed., 1985).
177. Corbeau, [1993] E.C.R. at 2566-67,
7 [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. at 642.
178. Id. at 2568.
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ered is therefore the extent to which a restriction on competition or even the exclusion of all competition from other economic operators is necessary in order to allow the holder of
the exclusive right to perform its task of general interest and
in particular to have the benefit of economically acceptable
1 79
conditions.
The Court assumed that the need to avoid overall losses presupposes that it will be possible to offset less profitable sectors
against the profitable sectors and, hence, justifies a restriction of
competition from individual undertakings in the economically
profitable sectors. The Court noted that it may be necessary to
prevent "cream skimming" by competitors.
The exclusion of competition, however, is not justified as
regards non-traditional separate services insofar as they do not
compromise the economic equilibrium of the service of general
economic interest provided by the monopoly. The Court stated:
[I] t is contrary to Article 90 of the EEC Treaty for legislation
of a Member State which confers on a body such as the R6gie
des Postes the exclusive right to collect, carry and distribute
mail, to prohibit, under threat of criminal penalties, an economic operator established in that State from offering certain
specific services dissociable from the service of general interest which meet the special needs of economic operators and
call for certain additional services not offered by the traditional postal service, in so far as those services do not compromise the economic equilibrium of the service of general economic interest performed by the holder of the exclusive
180
right.
Although the Court does not always accept either the Advocate Generals' conclusions or their ways of framing issues, the
opinion of Advocate General Tesauro in Corbeau is important.
He explained that the "central question" was the application of
Article 86 and 90 to exclusive rights. He concluded that the case
law confirms that Community law imposes precise limits on the
freedom of Member States to confer exclusive rights. Measures
that extend the scope of an exclusive right are not, by their nature, different from measures that create an exclusive right. In
both cases, the essential point consists in verifying if the meas179. Id. at 2568-69.
180. Id. at 2570.
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ures in question are objectively justified. The Court's earlier
judgment concerned primarily the examination of the justification for exclusive rights. In this perspective, it is necessary to
determine whether the exclusive rights conferred by Member
States are justified by the needs of the general interest consistent
with the aims of the Community. In this framework, Advocate
General Tesauro noted that it is essential to respect the proportionality principle so that restrictions of competition are permissible only insofar as they are indispensable to satisfy the needs
that justify the exclusive rights.
In particular, in light of the Advocate General's opinion,
the natural way, and indeed the only way, to understand the
Corbeaujudgment is to say that the Court agreed with the Advocate General that exclusive rights may be given to carry out services of general economic interest (but not for other purposes)
and insofar, but only insofar, as the restrictions on competition,
or even the exclusion of all competition, are necessary to ensure
the performance of the tasks. It is only if the judgment is understood in this way that the last paragraphs of the judgment make
sense. Article 90(2) expressly allows the normal rules of the EC
Treaty to be set aside only for undertakings entrusted with the
operation of services of general economic interest. Because the
Court went on to consider whether the monopoly was too wide
and held that it was, the only reasonable interpretation of the
judgment is that the Court is applying the test: is it necessary to
ensure that the tasks are performed? Because this is precisely in
line with the long established case law already referred to, this
interpretation is entirely reasonable and must be correct. A
small minority of lawyers, however, have not hesitated to state
that the Court in Corbeau expressed itself badly and, if it meant
what is said, was wrong to suggest that the freedom of Member
States to set up monopolies is limited in any way. They have
181
sought to rely on some more recent judgments.
In the Port of Genoa case, 182 the Court stated that merely creating a dominant position by granting exclusive rights is not, as
such, contrary to Articles 86 and 90 if the dominant enterprise,
merely by exercising its exclusive rights, cannot avoid abusing its
181. Giorgio Banchero, Case C-387/93, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 829; Porto di Genova,
[1991] E.C.R. at 1-5889.
182. Porto di Genova, [19911 E.C.R. at 1-5928, 17.
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dominant position, or when its exclusive rights induce it to
abuse its position. In the Crespelle case, 18 3 the Court, for no obvious reason, stated that a Member State only infringes Articles 86
and 90 when the enterprise is led, by the mere exercise of its
exclusive rights, to abuse its dominant position. This simplified
phrase was repeated in Banchero.1 '
The Court could not have meant to say that the only possible circumstances in which there can be a breach of Articles 86
and 90 is when an exclusive right leads to an abuse. There are
plainly many other circumstances in which a Member State measure might require or lead to behavior in violation of Article 86
and no exclusive rights need be involved.
The explanation is not difficult. In the Crespelle case, the
alleged abuse was excessive prices, and the Court explained that
the applicable question was whether the prices were the direct
consequences of the law conferring the exclusive rights. Naturally, it held that they were not. In other words,. the Court was
merely saying that it was not in itself a breach of Articles 86
through 90 for a law to grant an exclusive right and thereby create a dominant position. It is a breach of those Articles only if
something more is shown. If the alleged abuse was excessive
prices, then a link between the law and the abuse must be
shown. Understood this way, the Court's language in Crespele
cannot be criticized. Similarly, in Banchero the Court went on to
say that the law in question had not necessarily led to the specific
behavior complained of.
This analysis demonstrates that the language in the recent
judgments does not overrule Corbeau and illustrates the danger
of making the mistake of treating a sentence from a Court judgment as if it were a legislative text. The better view is that the
Court meant what it said in Corbeau, which corresponds to what
it has said in its consistent case law in other areas. Therefore,
Member States are free to set up monopolies provided that they
do so to provide a service in the general economic interest and
the means used are no more restrictive than is necessary to
achieve the objective.
Although it has been necessary to analyze the issue, it has
183. Centre d'Insemination de la Crespelle v. Cooperative del la Mayenne, Case C323/93, [1994] E.C.R. 1-5077, 1 18.
184. Giorgio Banchero, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 857-58, 1 51.
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probably less relevance in high technology industries than it has
had in the past. The Commission's Directive on Telecommunications, based on Article 90, requires Member States to end exclusive rights in that sector.1 5 Therefore, the question will not
arise in practice in the most important high technology sector in
which it has arisen. Member States are not likely to try to establish new monopolies in the biotechnology industry. The principle, however, might be important in privatization cases, because
it would seem to make it unlawful under Community law to protect a company from being privatized whether to promote the
interests of the new shareholders or to increase the price at
which the shares would be initially sold.
4. National Limits on Competition
The Court has repeatedly held that Member States may not
require or encourage the adoption of agreements, decisions, or
concerted practices contrary to Article 85 of the EC Treaty, reinforce their effects, or deprive official rules of the characters of
legislation by delegating to private parties decisions concerning
the economic sphere.1 8 6 A genuine public measure limiting
price competition, however, cannot be criticized under Community law on the grounds that Article 85 would not permit the
companies affected to achieve the same result themselves.
The Court has not yet had to consider the argument that
just as Community law allows freedom of movement of goods
and freedom to supply services to be restricted only for a legitimate reason in the general interest and if the means used are no
more restrictive than is necessary, so Member States may restrict
competition in price or otherwise only in the general interest
and insofar as it is essential to achieve the objective sought. This
principle is, as already mentioned, a broad principle of Commu185. Commission Directive No. 88/301, O.J. L 131/73 (1988).
186. Van Eycke, [1988] E.C.R. 4769, 4791
16, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 330, 339; Opinion of Advocate General van Gerven, Netherlands v. Commission, Case C-48/90 & C66/90), [1992] E.C.R. 1-565, 615-19, [hereinafter Dutch PTT], Case C-2/91, [1993]
E.C.R. 1-5791, 1 14; Bundesansalt fur den Guterfernverkehr v. Gebruder Reiff BmbH &
Co KG, Case C-185/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-5801, 5846-47, 12, [1995] 5 C.M.L.R. 145, 175;
Germany v. Delta Schiffahrts-und Speditionsgesellschaft GmbH, Case C-153/93, [1994]
E.C.R. 1-2517, 2529
12, [1996] 4 C.M.L.R. 21, 29; Peralta, Case 379/92, [1994] E.C.R.
1-3453,1-3496, 21; Tankstation 't Heukske VOF &JBE Boermans, Cases C-401-402/92,
[1994] E.C.R. 1-2199; GB-Inno-BM, [1977] E.C.R. 2115, 2144 131 (providing Article 86
analysis).

19971

COMMUNITY ANTITRUST LAW

nity law, and because competition is one of the foundations on
which the Community is built, it seems reasonable to say that
Community law creates a limited freedom to compete as well as a
limited freedom to supply services. This principle would allow,
for example, restrictions of competition in biotechnology for
human health, environmental reasons, and on ethical grounds,
and restrictions on competition in telecommunications and
broadcasting due to, among other factors, shortage of frequencies or a policy of preventing excessive concentration of media
ownership.
This principle would also be relevant to the question of
whether national regulators should impose on non-dominant
companies obligations similar to those imposed on dominant
companies. If obligations, for example, to provide access or interconnection, are imposed on non-dominant companies, in
particular if the beneficiaries of these obligations include the
dominant companies, the scope for effective competition may be
significantly lessened. It is, in general, procompetitive to allow
companies to retain for their own use assets that they have legitimately acquired or constructed. This freedom should normally
be curtailed only for strong public interest purposes or if the
company is dominant.
5. National Approval of Restrictive Agreements
National regulatory or other non-competition authorities
have no power to approve restrictive agreements under Article
85(3). They are subject to all other rules of Community law that
apply to national competition authorities."8 7
6. Ensuring Community Competition Law is Applied
National regulatory authorities have a duty to take measures
to ensure that Community competition law can be satisfactorily
applied. When it necessitates cost accounting information to ensure that there is no unlawful cross-subsidizing or predatory pricing, the regulator presumably has a duty to ensure that all that
information is available. Clearly a dominant company should
not be in a better position if it keeps inadequate cost accounting
data than if it keeps complete information. Therefore, if a domi187. See generally Temple Lang, supra note 167 (detailing restrictions on national
regulatory and other non-competitive authorities).
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nant firm was found not to have taken the steps necessary to
provide whatever cost accounting information was needed, it
might be appropriate for national courts to apply a rebuttable
presumption that unlawful behavior had occurred.
IV. PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES FOR LAWYERS
For lawyers, the first consequence of all this is that a good
deal of specialized knowledge is needed, both of the special
rules of law on biotechnology, software copyright, and telecommunications, and of the science and technology involved. These
areas of law are presently interdisciplinary. It follows that, for
example, an antitrust lawyer specializing in mergers will need
the help of a lawyer specializing in telecommunications if he or
she is to deal satisfactorily with a merger in the telecommunications sector.
In fact, for antitrust lawyers one of the main problems in
high technology industries is a simple one: the future of high
technology industries is far harder to foresee than the future of
other industries. This does not matter much under Article 85 of
the EC Treaty because the Commission could, if necessary, reconsider a negative clearance, an individual exemption, or a prohibition if circumstances change. It is particularly important in
cases under the Merger Regulation where decisions are definitive and cannot be reconsidered even if the market does not develop as expected. Under Article 86, the extent of the problem
varies with the circumstances. Unquestionable dominance today
may disappear if competitors achieve a technical breakthrough.
The problem is more difficult in essential facilities cases in which
the Commission may have to decide as best it can, in effect,
whether competition will be encouraged most in the medium or
long-term by allowing a dominant company to refuse access to a
facility that is essential, thereby preventing competition from
emerging in the short-term, but forcing competitors to develop
their own facilities in the medium term, or somehow to invent
around the problem. Behavior that is now exclusionary may
cease to be so if circumstances or technology changes, if the cost
of building an alternative infrastructure or facility comes down,
or if new scientific techniques or technological solutions are
found.
The problem of technological change also creates a diffi-
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culty for lawyers notifying agreements. Statements are made in
notifications in high technology industries that are perfectly accurate at the time they are made but that are no longer correct a
few months later. I suggest that at least until the Commission
takes a final position on a notification, lawyers have a professional duty to correct any statements in notifications, complaints,
or other submissions that have ceased to be accurate. Lawyers
need to advise their clients that changed circumstances may have
made it likely or inevitable that the Commission, if asked to do
so, would revise or withdraw authorizations already given.
This illustrates another consequence of rapid technological
change. The Commission, as far as it is able to without being
able to foresee the future any better than anyone else, may need
to try to make clear the possible future changes of circumstances
that would lead it to alter its conclusions in a particular case.
This is not easy, among other reasons, because the Commission
may need to avoid inhibiting desirable technological change.
For example, the Commission might need to be careful to avoid
stating that it would always be an abuse for a dominant company
to integrate different modules of its products, thereby preventing competitors from selling them separately, if integration
would be desirable and improve the combined products.
As a result of all this, some national courts and national
competition authorities tend to feel, rightly or wrongly, that they
do not have the time, the manpower, or the expertise to deal
with the competition issues arising in these sectors and that they
should leave them either to the Commission or to the relevant
national regulatory authority.
Another practical consequence for lawyers concerns tactics
in litigation on Community antitrust law issues. Of course, the
tactics thought desirable vary greatly according to circumstances.
Rapid technological change, however, may lead a company to
fight a case against the Commission through the Community
courts in the hope that even if it loses, it will make enough
money meanwhile to justify the litigation. A company tempted
to do this should remember that although there have been few
claims for compensation for breach of Community antitrust
law,188 the Commission encourages such claims,189 and such
claims will certainly become more common. In a high technol188. SeeJohn Temple Lang, EEC Competition Actions in Member States' Couits Claims
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ogy industry, the amount of compensation that might have to be
paid for loss caused during several years of litigation could be
enormous. Also, the uncertainty resulting from continuing litigation might make company planning difficult. In high technology industries settlements should always be considered. This is
so, because the Court of Justice has said so often and so clearly
that national courts must give effective remedies for breach of
Community law. 190 Although this has usually been stated in connection with remedies against a Member State, the same duty
certainly applies to remedies for loss caused by private parties.
Claims for compensation for loss due to breach of Community
antitrust law will increase.
One of the difficulties apparently experienced by plaintiffs
is the need to prove the amount of their losses, including, proving what a price would have been if there had been no price
fixing or what profits they would have made if they had not been
excluded from a market. National courts, in order to fulfil their
duty under Community law to give effective remedies, may be
led to adopt presumptions as to probable quantum of loss, to
avoid having to answer such speculative questions. Such presumptions would certainly cause an increase in claims for compensation.
In this context, a recent judgment of the English High
Court is important.'9 1 The Commission had adopted a decision 192 finding that the British Gypsum Group had infringed Article 86 in a number of ways. British Gypsum appealed to the
Community Courts and lost their appeal.1 93 Iberian which had
initially complained to the Commission, then brought proceedfor Damages, Declarations and Injunctions for Breach of Community Antitrust Law, in 1983
FORDHAM CORP. L. INsT. 219 (Barry Hawk ed., 1984).
189. Notice on Cooperation Between National Courts and the Commission in applying Article 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, O.J. C 39/6 (1993); Notice on Cooperation
Between National Courts and the Commission in the Field of State Aid, OJ. C 312/8
(1995).
190. See e.g., Factortame, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 889.
191. Iberian UK Ltd v. BPB Industries Plc and Another, [119] E.C.C. 467; see Hasselblad (GB) Ltd v. Orbison [1985] 1 Q.B. 475 : cf. Macarthy v. Unichem, unreported
judgment of Scott J, English High Court, Nov. 24, 1989; Temple Lang, supra note 167,
at 568-70.
192. Commission Decision No. 89/22/EEC, OJ. L 10/50 (1989) [hereinafter BPB
Industries].
193. BPB Industries plc v. Commission, [1995] E.C.R. at 1-865, [1997] 4 C.M.L.R.
at 238.
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ings for compensation. British Gypsum argued that the English
courts could not accept the Commission's decision, even after it
had been upheld on appeal, as evidence that there had been an
infringement of Article 86 by British Gypsum. In effect, they argued that Iberian had to start again from the beginning and
were free to argue that the Commission and the Community
courts were wrong. Not surprisingly this argument was rejected.
The English court held that defendants may not ask national
courts to reconsider a Commission decision in such circumstances. National courts should take all reasonable steps to avoid
or reduce the risk of conflict between their judgments and decisions and judgments of the Community institutions.
Another possible consequence of the duty of national courts
94
to give effective remedies for breach of Community law'
should be mentioned. In a high technology industry, a company
that had suffered serious loss due to an EC antitrust violation
might go out of business if it could not obtain an interim payment of part of the compensation due to it, even if the exact
amount of the total compensation owed was still undetermined.
A national court might, therefore, have a duty under EC law to
order an interim payment in such circumstances, despite that it
would not do so in a case governed only by national law.
In general, antitrust issues in high technology industries
are even more fact-based than antitrust issues in other industries.
Because the facts in dispute often concern the future as well as
the present, the European Commission has shown on occasion
that it is willing to be influenced by its view of the future, but
only with caution.
Another practical conclusion for lawyers is that a knowledge
of the many facets of the relationships between Community law
and national law is even more essential in high technology industries, at least those that continue to be regulated, than in other
industries. I have drawn attention to this previously' 95 and it
194. Factortame, [1990] E.C.R. at 1-2433, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 589; Vandevenne,
[1991] E.C.R. at 1-4371, Marshall11, [1993] E.C.R. at 1-4367, (1993) 3 C.M.L.R. at 293;
Brasseriedu Picheur,[1996] C.M.L.R. at 889; Syndicat Francais de I'Express International
(SFEI) and Others v. La Poste and Others, Case C 39/94, (1996] 3 C.M.L.1R 369; Regina v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Hedley Lomas (Ireland)
Ltd., Case C 5/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 391; seeJeremy Lever, UK Economic Regulation: Use
and Abuse of the Law, 1992 EUR. COMPETMON L. REv. 55-65.
195. Temple Lang, supra note 167; Temple Lang, supra note 188; see BLANco, supra
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should be no surprise to Canadian and U.S. lawyers. Antitrust
specialists need to be aware of this.
It seems likely that, for many reasons that have been
touched on in this Article and for other reasons, complaints in
high technology industries will in general concern anticompetitive abuses rather than exploitative abuses. Because the former
lead to more effective remedies, the Commission should afford
them higher priority.19 6
CONCLUSION197

With little discussion, the Commission has made use of the
concept of competition in R&D, rather than the concept of innovation markets, to object to several mergers, and will no doubt
do so again.
Some of the antitrust law difficulties that arise in high technology industries are due to rapid change and the difficulty of
foreseeing the future, not to advanced technology itself. Difficulties of these kinds will remain, and some adjustment in procedural rules about, for example, appellate arguments and interim
measures, may be needed.
High technology industries tend to raise new antitrust issues
that have to be resolved by reference to basic principles of antitrust law or antitrust economics. This makes demands on lawyers. It may well also mean that these issues will be ultimately
resolved in the same manner in the European Community and
in the United States, because most of the basic principles are the
same. In the future, the World Trade Organization and trade
related intellectual property issues, not discussed in this article,
will probably be increasingly important for high technology industries in particular.
High technology industries have already raised a wide variety of new antitrust issues in the European Community, so wide
that they cannot be neatly classified. They will certainly raise
other new issues in the future, as well as those mentioned in this
Article. New antitrust issues may require new answers and soluat 11-34; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, XXIVTH REPORT ON COMPETITION PoucY
1994, at 29-30, §§ 23-24, 41-43, §§ 48-52, 67-74, §§ 95-104 (1995).
196. Temple Lang, supra note 188, at 245-47.
197. See Ungerer, supra note 5, at 1173-77; see also Simon M. Taylor, Aftice 90 and

note 31,

Telecommunications Monopolies, 15 EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 322 (1994).

1997]

COMMUNITY ANTITRUST LAW

817

tions, and lawyers and enforcement authorities must be ready to
develop them when that is necessary. However, they should not
look for new answers when the old ones would do just as well.
High technology industries in the European Community
raise many issues involving patents and other intellectual property rights, as they have done in the United States, but because
of the diversity of Member State intellectual property laws, useful
generalizations are difficult or impossible to set forth. There has
been little interest in the European Community Patent Convention because it is at present structured in such a way that a national court in one Member State could, without necessarily getting the agreement of the Community courts, invalidate a Community Patent in the whole of the European Community. There
is also an unresolved controversy over the extent to which it
should be made possible by directive to patent biotechnological
and genetic engineering inventions. When these two issues are
ultimately resolved, EC intellectual property law in high technology industries will move forward rapidly. The work of the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products will also
alter market conditions.
New combinations of different kinds of companies in strategic alliances may necessitate more sophisticated types of economic analysis. For example, if a dominant telecommunications
company joins with a satellite TV company to enter into the
cable business and promote interactive services, such a pincer
movement requires a much more complex analysis than merely
"potential competition" or barriers to entry.
The Commission already begins more procedures on its
own initiative in high technology industries than in other industries, to prevent companies obtaining advantages from delaying
or avoiding notification and to ensure that similar cases are
treated similarly. This more proactive policy may have to develop even further and may come to have implications for the
Commission's view of its antitrust role and responsibilities.
The distinction between concentrative and cooperative
mergers is particularly difficult and unsatisfactory in the complicated circumstances of high technology industries. It would be a
big step forward to abolish the distinction as is now suggested.
The more technical, sophisticated, and rapidly-changing the
industry, the greater the informational gap is likely to be be-
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tween the companies involved in a given transaction or behavior
and the antitrust authorities, including the courts. In high technology industries, antitrust authorities may need to take special

measures to close this gap. One solution may be close cooperation with regulatory authorities.
Community-level regulation, and perhaps regulatory au-

thorities, may be needed in some high technology industries.
Community antitrust law cannot be used to achieve purely regulatory objectives. Furthermore, it may not prove possible to

achieve regulatory objectives satisfactorily by uncoordinated national regulation.
Some antitrust issues, for example, determining a reasonable price for access to an essential facility, are close to being
regulatory in nature. In general, Community antitrust law seems
better prepared to address high technology industries than national regulation in Member States. Thus, there will be demands
to use antitrust law for essentially regulatory objectives. The
Commission will probably leave borderline issues to national regulators whenever possible.
High technology industries involve many relationships between competitors, as suppliers of goods or services to one another, or because their products need to work together and to
be compatible with one another. Some companies' product
specifications are de facto standards for other companies. In
these circumstances, the duty of moderation in behavior likely to
harm other companies (other than by offering better products
at lower prices), which results from the principle of proportionality, is likely to grow in importance. This duty is relevant to the
distinction between anticompetitive or exclusionary behavior of
dominant companies and legitimate competition and defense of
the dominant company's interests. It concerns both the incidental consequences of changes in a dominant company's product
and dominant companies' reactions to competitive initiatives, as
in the United Brands-Olesencase. 198 The proportionality principle
may also be relevant to exploitative abuses.

198. United Brands Co. v. Commission, Case 27/76, (1978] E.C.R. 207, 293,
1 189-94, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. 429, 496-97.

